


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# NATIONAL REVIEW

20 Cents

March 9, 1957

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

*An Open Letter to*  
*Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer*

MEDFORD EVANS

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*Articles and Reviews by* . . . . . FRED A UTLEY  
L. BRENT BOZELL • JAMES BURNHAM • WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM  
WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR. • SAM M. JONES • WILLMOORE KENDALL

# NATIONAL REVIEW

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

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views of the editors.

# The WEEK

● We have written a great deal about the merits of the case. We have explored Egypt's claims against Israel, Israel's against the Arabs, the world's against Egypt and Israel, the Suez Canal Company's against Nasser: but at this moment we look not at all at the merits of the case. It is simply a fact that the tiny state of Israel, an exiguous little enclave in a hostile world, has defied and successfully defied the Soviet Union, the Arab World, the United Nations, and the United States. How? By identifying the national interest—and settling for nothing less. It is an ancient formula. But it is not—and here is the lesson for Mr. Eisenhower—an anachronistic one.

● When President Eisenhower suffered his two attacks, stock prices tumbled, a phenomenon that encouraged an identification of the President's health with the health of the economy. The President's budget is undermining that assumption. At a recent meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers, the board of directors met the challenge "What Would You Cut Out?" by saying just *what* they would cut out, and it totaled eight billion. In a letter to one thousand Chambers throughout the land, the president of the New York State Chamber of Commerce predicted that the proposed budget would give the welfare state its "greatest impetus" since the war, and characterized aid to education as "one of the most dangerous federal projects in our lifetime." If the President doesn't watch out, the stock market will exhibit a cold indifference to White House medical reports.

● To the enthusiastic applause of the Communists, President Sukarno has proposed that Indonesia abandon the Western type of parliamentary democracy for a new governmental "conception" (as he calls it) that would be based on *gotong rajong* ("mutual help"). Essentially his plan seems to be for an authoritarian governmental structure operating through an all-party cabinet (so that no party will be in opposition) and a new "Council," led by Sukarno, which would be a kind of simulacrum of Indonesian society. The practical political meaning of the plan is simple. Under it the Communists, now kept out of the government by the powerful Moslem parties, would be given full participation, the best chances for penetration and, if past performance is a guide, victory in the Czechoslovakian pattern.

● Tanzan Ishibashi, who resigned as Premier of Japan last week for reasons of health, was probably

the most anti-American leader of the ruling conservative (Liberal-Democratic) party. Nobusuke Kishi, who replaced him, is, in contrast, probably the most pro-American. Kishi advocates close ties with the U.S. and a tough policy toward native Communists. He approves of the security pact under whose terms American troops are permitted in Japan. He is for increasing trade with Communist China, to be sure, but unlike most Japanese politicians, he opposes formal recognition of the Peiping regime. He is, in short, something like the man we would like to see at the helm of a nation as essential to our Pacific defenses as Japan. The United States should seize the opportunity to encourage mutually profitable economic and political relations.

● Hungarians are fleeing Hungary and Englishmen are fleeing England; and, though it does not appear to be so on the surface, the reason is essentially the same: a lack of freedom. The flight from England has not been precipitated by massive physical brutalities, but the basic cause of it is the rigors and hopelessness induced by a controlled and politically-managed economy. The reports indicate that the flight from British austerity is becoming something of a stampede. Before Suez, about 120,000 persons a year were emigrating from England, mainly to other parts of the Empire, and now that figure has more than doubled. And two out of five Englishmen (a Gallup Poll reports) would like to leave, if they could. The consulates in London are besieged with applicants, mostly young people seeking a chance at a better life; and the government is worried by the prospect of being left with an aged population. Where will Americans go when socialism triumphs over here? Maybe England will be free by that time.

● On February 25, Socialist Guy Mollet became *le recordman* in the 23rd postwar running of the French Premiership Derby, beating by 24 hours the 390-day record set by Henri Queuille eight years ago. For his staying qualities, *Le Monde* awarded Mollet *le maillot jaune*, the yellow jersey which the victor of each day's lap wears in that other gruelling Gallic contest, the month-long Tour de France. France has managed to get along with a single government for more than a year because Guy Mollet has become irreplaceable—irreplaceable in the sense that among the 626 other National Assembly deputies there are few, if any, candidates for his job.

● The delicate diplomatic maneuvering over control of the Gulf of Aqaba is significantly related to the Israeli plan for an oil pipeline from Elath, at the head of the Gulf, to the Mediterranean. An eight-inch line, more than sufficient for Israel's own needs, is nearly completed. French interests, headed by the great

Franco-Jewish banking house of Lazard Frères, are prepared to finance an additional eighteen-inch line. If tankers could sail freely up the gulf to Elath, this would enable a substantial flow of oil to bypass the Suez Canal, and would thus break Egypt's stranglehold on the European oil supply.

● While American policy bolsters his regime, Egyptian Premier Nasser continues his war against the West. The Voice of Cairo broadcasts propaganda to Africa that is indistinguishable from Moscow's. A thousand Egyptian technicians and agents in Tunisia prepare the political and technical sabotage of the

### *For the Record*

The American Civil Liberties Union charges that the contempt of court citations against John Kaspar and 16 other persons arrested in the Clinton integration dispute are unconstitutional. The ACLU claims the Federal Court injunction against interfering with a court order to integrate the Clinton High School violated First Amendment guarantees of free speech and free association. . . . A group of prominent Tennesseans (The Clinton Freedom Fund committee) are raising money to fight the case. . . . In testimony before the House Education subcommittee, the chairman of the Georgia Board of Education said Georgia could take care of its own school building program. Federal funds mean federal interference, he said, and Georgia wants none of it. The Georgia Senate last week adopted a resolution banning the dissemination of UNESCO one-world propaganda material in Georgia schools. . . . The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association has upheld the ABA's endorsement of the Bricker Amendment which will come up for a vote in the Senate again next year. . . . The ABA has also recommended that its 1,400 member bar associations widely disseminate a document entitled "The Meaning of Communism" drawn up by the Florida Bar Association last fall. . . . Look for a heightened drive by the unions against "right to work" legislation in Indiana, Idaho and Delaware, where passage seems probable. Senator Goldwater suggests that, while it is about it, the House Judiciary Committee, which is drafting an omnibus civil rights bill, add a clause barring discrimination against an individual for "belonging or not belonging to a union." . . . Robert Kennedy, counsel for the Senate's Select Committee on Labor and Management Practices, reports that records of the Teamsters Union relevant to the committee's inquiries have been destroyed in Seattle, Portland and elsewhere. . . . The West Coast organ of the Communist Party, the *Daily People's World*, switched last week from daily to weekly publication following a circulation drop of 15 per cent.



great Wheelus air base. Egyptian-trained terrorists and revolutionaries are dispatched to block any peaceable solution of the Algerian troubles. Cairo University turns out fanatical Moslem missionaries to undermine the Western position in Central Africa. Nasser himself has his regular consultations with Soviet Ambassador Kisserev.

- Domestic conflicts in Spain, which have been expressed during the past year in a number of student demonstrations and several strikes, have now led to the reorganization of General Franco's cabinet. The roots of disturbance are partly economic: the inflationary rise in the cost of living. There also seems to be in process a political struggle between the Falange, the sole legally recognized political party, on the one side, and the "traditionalist" Spanish forces—monarchical, religious and military—on the other. The target is not Franco, who continues his indispensable role of integrating the contending groups, but the succession to Franco. And the newly appointed cabinet indicates that Franco is still unwilling to solve that problem beyond doubt.

- In the course of discussion over proposed cutbacks in some of the Air Force procurement programs, the Defense Department has disclosed that last year's official estimates of Soviet bomber strength were grossly overstated. It would seem relevant for Congress to find out just what the reason was for this major addition to the long record of faulty intelligence that has been chalked up by CIA.

- In its backing and filling on the "de-Stalinization" issue, the Kremlin has announced forthcoming publication of the complete works of Lenin—which, oddly enough, have never yet been printed in their entirety. *Pravda* stressed "the role of V. I. Lenin as the founder of the USSR, as the director of the Soviet state"—as if to counterbalance Khrushchev's speech a few days earlier in renewed praise of Stalin's leadership. Publication of the complete Lenin would immediately raise the problem of Trotsky, Stalin's greatest rival and enemy. Many of Lenin's writings show Trotsky as far more important than Stalin in the victory of the Revolution. It has also been noticed that in last year's printings of "rehabilitated authors," a number of Trotskyists were included.

- Bertrand Russell, the British earl, philosopher and mathematician who sees the U.S. as a land of gibbets, dungeons and rubber-hose beatings in torture chambers, seldom misses an opportunity to lay it all at the doorstep of the FBI. What will he say, then, about the Freedoms Foundation's award for 1956 of \$5,000 in cash and a special George Washington Honor Medal to J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI's boss? That we have

suddenly taken to honoring the Himmlers among us? In accepting the award, Mr. Hoover warned of the "new look and program" of the Communist conspiracy, which is designed to "enable the American Communists to regroup and develop a militant party to accomplish their 'historic mission' of destroying American freedoms." Mr. Hoover stands convicted by his words of having actually read what the Communists have to say about their own destiny. To Earl Russell, product of a superior civilization, anyone who is naive enough to think words have meanings is obviously a sinister character. And those who would honor such a man with \$5,000 and a George Washington Honor Medal must be in the devil's pay.

- We can picture it now. On the Great Salt flats. President Eisenhower is there, flanked by his Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy and Air. Fifty television cameras in action. Hundreds of news photographers. Reporters, foreign correspondents, political and gossip commentators by the trainload. Armed guards checking every pass, and knots of harrassed, weary scientists, some in mufti, some in uniform, checking their figures one last time. The explanations, the charts, the flying pencils, the craning necks. The last minute report on meteorological conditions. The strange and streamlined monster cradling in its womb the first earth satellite. Final tense instructions and a voice—inhuman and husky—almost whispering into the loudspeakers, 5-4-3-2-1, and the roar as the monster blasts off on the first real conquest of space. . . . But you know what—and don't ask us how we know—you know what? It's not going to work.

## ***He Might Have Asked . . .***

When Stalin had a propagandistic move to make, he seldom favored the ordinary Western press corps which sits plaintively in Moscow waiting for crumbs. Instead, he would invariably utilize some potentate of journalism, a traveling Roy Howard or an Eric Johnston with an assignment to do "My Interview with Stalin" for a mass magazine. Dressed out in resplendent type, the resulting interview would seem freighted with High Significance. But when the tumult had died away with the last editorial reference to his golden words, Stalin would go back to his more usual game of chopping heads.

It is with some patient weariness, then, that we read the account of Joseph Alsop's recent interview with that "remarkable man," Nikita S. Khrushchev, who, despite his vaunted "de-Stalinization" moves, has continued the Stalinist methods of dealing with the press. In an "absorbingly interesting interview



of two hours" (Mr. Alsop's description) Khrushchev outlined his ideas for "normalizing" Soviet relations with the U.S. Being a respectful man, Mr. Alsop pressed Mr. Khrushchev on nothing; he simply let himself be used as a sounding board for the proposition that, in return for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iron Curtain fringe lands, the U.S. should withdraw from Central Europe, meaning Germany, and liquidate its foreign bases. To make his proposition sound "logical," Mr. Khrushchev asked innocently: "What would American public opinion think if the Soviet Union were to succeed in establishing bases in Mexico or Canada?"

Well, American public opinion wouldn't think much of it. But the little difference which Khrushchev overlooks—and which Alsop failed to call to

the Big Man's attention—is that America maintains bases abroad because her foreign allies have asked for help in a common program of defense. Since they can read, our allies know that the Communists have proclaimed the conquest of the world as integral to the unfolding of Marxist-Leninist destiny. Despite occasional tactical prattle of coexistence, the Communists have never missed an opportunity to push the conquest along. If Canada and Mexico were to invite the Soviet Union to construct bases on their soil because of any feared depredation of the U.S., there might be some logical basis for comparison. But our neighbors fear no U.S. conquest—and if the Soviets ever did make a move to build airfields in northern Canada, the Ottawa government would certainly put in a hurry call to Washington for help.

If Mr. Alsop had been in a creative mood about that interview, he might have posed some counter-offers—say, the founding of bona fide democratic political parties and a free press in Hungary and Poland as the pre-condition of a deal. With ordinary Bill of Rights freedom equalized throughout the world, America could safely trade an abandonment of bases for Soviet troop withdrawals.

Mr. Khrushchev, however, wasn't speaking to Alsop about a world of bona fide sovereign nations. He was, in effect, asking the U.S. to abandon all its friends, meanwhile relying on the proximity of Soviet tanks to the Hungarian and Polish borders to keep the Iron Curtain fringe lands in a posture of measured, but still quite humble, subjection.

## Beyond The "Times"

Marshalling its very considerable powers of obfuscation, the *New York Times* has written an editorial giving the reasons why the United States should extend aid to Poland. The editorial is complicated and diffuse, and to challenge it in its entirety is to challenge the *Times*' cosmology, which is more than we're up to at the moment. We confine our comments to two statements. The *Times* writes that "the greatest issue of our time is human freedom" and that "in Poland today we have an example of a Communist country which has realized the truth and which is making progress toward increasing human freedom."

It is true that there is greater human freedom in Poland today than there was a year ago. But it is not true—it is dangerously untrue—that the freedom has been extended as the result of a conscious recognition by the leaders of Poland of the fact that human freedom is a "truth." "Freedom," in that it is not scientific, cannot, according to Marx, be "true." Freedom of action in this area or the other is neither



A Book of Verses underneath the Bough,  
A Jug of Wine, a Loaf of Bread—and thou  
Beside me singing in the Wilderness—  
Ah, Wilderness were Paradise enow!

(Reproduced by permission of the proprietors of Punch)

true nor untrue; particular freedoms are merely useful or not useful instruments in time and place for the achievement of the socialist society. Those of us who know that the socialist society cannot be achieved except by force know that Communists, of whatever species, cannot countenance meaningful personal freedom. That freedom which exists in Poland today was exacted of the governors of Poland by a people who thrashed out against the restrictions of the Communist society; and the people were given only as much freedom as was absolutely necessary to prevent an explosion. To assume that the people were given that freedom because the governors perceived a universal Truth is, well, is to qualify to write editorials for the *New York Times*.

In its zeal to make its point, the *Times* ends up with the statement that "already freedom in Poland is as great as or greater than in some other countries we aid; for example, Spain . . ." Now quite apart from the fact that the Spaniard enjoys, in his day-to-day existence, a measure of personal freedom infinitely greater than that of the Pole, the mere attempt at the analogy is vulgar and a travesty. The government of Francisco Franco is unattractive to us for many reasons. But Franco is a part, and an integral part, of Western civilization. He represents the not unfaithful convergence of the multifarious political, philosophical, religious and cultural tendencies that have shaped Spanish history. The nature of his dictatorship is organically different from that of the Communists; and he remains, for all the faults of his system, the man to whom the Spanish people look—as the Chinese have looked to Chiang, for all his faults—for leadership.

Are these distinctions beyond the *Times*?

## On Nuclear Warfare

In a speech before the Reserve Officers Association, Secretary Quarles demonstrated that no nation will abstain from using its most powerful weapons if, without them, it is faced with defeat. To rely on a pact outlawing nuclear weapons would be to put suicidal faith in the "morality or even rationality" of the enemy.

Dr. Edward Teller, "father of the H-bomb," writing for the *Air Force Magazine*, does not see a moral distinction between the use of conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. He insists that, as long as agents of destruction are directed against the enemy's military targets, that is, not at the civilian population, they differ only in relative effectiveness.

Because war will be hell, the rankest sin, in Dr. Teller's eyes, consists in "provoking war by not being prepared." He believes that with vision and work we can so organize our defenses—as well as our power

of retaliation—that "a terrible attack could hurt us but could not destroy us." The war will be won by the civilization which can struggle through after its industrial plant has been destroyed.

"We can produce fat and store it," Dr. Teller concludes. "The Russians cannot."

## The Greatest of Them All

Professor Zechariah Chafee, who died the other day, was undoubtedly a man with the courage of his convictions, a selfless and devoted researcher, and a teacher-publicist who knew how to move men to the measure of his arguments. He was also a fanatic, a Comstock-in-reverse, who elevated the Bill of Rights to the status of an orthodoxy, which none could question without incurring his wrath and, in due course, a barrage from his heavy artillery. Like other fanatics, he was stone-blind to any and all facts inconvenient to his position—and channeled incredible energies into assembling and communicating the facts that were congenial to that position.

Writing, as he did, for a couple of generations of lawyers and political scientists that required from their teachers nothing but facts, he came to exercise an enormous—and baneful—influence. He saw, and taught large numbers of our lawyers and political scientists to see, an anti-Communist behind every tree and would-be censor under every bed; he hated, and taught most of our lawyers and political scientists to hate, anti-Communists and any person professionally engaged in safeguarding internal security; and he denied, and taught nearly all our lawyers and political scientists to deny, that poisoners of the wells of public discussion pose problems that might require fresh thinking. In a word: he set the tone of contemporary Liberal doctrine about freedom of thought and speech; and it will be many a long day before we are through paying for him. He was the greatest anti-anti-Communist of them all.

He knew more and understood less about freedom of thought and speech than any other prominent writer of his time, and we have in large part because of him a whole breed of lawyers and political scientists who know everything about it and understand nothing.

## Rock 'n' Roll 'n' All

Rock 'n' roll may be the most, or it may be for squares, but it sure has the world in a tizzy for words to describe it. There's Dizzy Gillespie, the band leader, for example—he says it's a "shshugamah, shshugamah" (careful, you linotypers) kind of beat. Asked to develop his thesis Dizzy goes



on to explain that rock 'n' roll "goes with all bird groups, the singers who shout whooo, whooo." If you can't understand that, says Dizzy, "why, man, you sure aren't with it."

Well, we always had a suspicion rock 'n' roll was for the birds, but that still doesn't give us the sweet-and-lowdown on such stampedes as the recent invasion of New York's Paramount Theater by hundreds of stompin' rock 'n' roll 'teen-agers. The office pessimist tells us that rock 'n' roll is a bored and empty generation's attempt to multiply the kicks which alone make life bearable to it. The office activist says that kids wouldn't be rock 'n' rollers if they were taught, say, to figure-skate, or even allowed to stay a few more years with marbles. Such explanations are as good as any, but they don't tell us what's the matter with an adult world that fails to make it possible for kids to enjoy themselves within the bounds of sanity. All we can say for rock 'n' roll is that it's better than dope. Looked at from that angle, maybe things are improving.

## ***Progressive Moderation***

*We cannot subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the strong; one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with us.*

—President Eisenhower, November 2, 1956

*There can, of course, be no equating of a nation like Israel with that of the Soviet Union. . . . We are entitled to expect, and do expect, from such peoples of the free world a contribution to world order which unhappily we cannot expect from a nation controlled by atheistic despots.*

—President Eisenhower, February 20, 1957

We have received the following telegram from Major Edgar C. Bundy, President of the Abraham Lincoln National Republican Club.

"REFERENCE REVILO OLIVER'S ACCOUNT OF LINCOLN DAY SEMINAR HELD IN CHICAGO FEBRUARY 9 I NOR ANYONE ELSE SOUGHT TO IMPUGN MOTIVES OF UNNAMED THIRD PARTY ADVOCATES. I STATED THAT CONSERVATIVES SUCH AS J. BRACKEN LEE AND HERMAN WELKER MIGHT HAVE BEEN REELECTED TO OFFICE IF CONSERVATIVES WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR THEM HAD NOT BEEN LED OFF INTO A THIRD PARTY MOVEMENT WHICH SPLIT VOTES, TIME, MONEY AND EFFORT WITHOUT PRODUCING ANYTHING POLITICALLY TANGIBLE. BOTH WELKER AND LEE EXPRESSED SIMILAR OPINIONS. NO FEELINGS OF OFFENSE HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED EITHER IN WRITING VIA PHONE OR IN PERSON BY ANYONE OVER THESE STATEMENTS BY ME. ALTHOUGH OLIVER MAY NOT HAVE FELT ANY VIBRATION OF ENTHUSIASM OR COMMON PURPOSE

IN THE MEETING HUNDREDS OF OTHERS DID. EVEN THE OPPOSITION PRESS ADMITTED IT WAS A MOST ENTHUSIASTIC DEMONSTRATION. APPLICANTS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE LINCOLN CLUB ARE POURING IN FROM ALL OVER THE NATION AND WE CAN'T KEEP UP WITH THE MAIL. REVERBERATIONS HAVE BEEN HEARD FROM CAPITOL HILL AND FROM STATE LEGISLATURES. THE CONSENSUS OF THE MAJORITY PACKING OUT THE BALLROOM WAS THAT IT WAS THE GREATEST MEETING OF CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICANS SINCE THE 1952 NATIONAL CONVENTION. WE ARE SORRY REVILO OLIVER DIDN'T GET INTO THE MAJORITY MOOD."

We have spoken with Professor Oliver, who stands by his statement that "some members of the audience," i.e., some persons with whom he spoke personally, interpreted some of Major Bundy's remarks as critical of the motives of some third party advocates. As to the second point, it is of course a matter of individual impression whether there was generated a "vibration of enthusiasm or common purpose." Both Mr. Oliver and NATIONAL REVIEW hope he was wrong, and that the admirable program of the Abraham Lincoln National Club will be realized.

*Our Contributors:* MEDFORD EVANS ("An Open Letter to Dr. Oppenheimer") is the author of *The Secret War for the A-Bomb*. Dr. Evans served with the Atomic Energy Commission for eight years. He is now with the Department of Social Sciences at Northwestern State College, Natchitoches, Louisiana. FRED UTLEY ("Dissent on Egypt") is author of *The Dream We Lost*, *The High Cost of Vengeance* and *The China Story*.

## ***Bound Volumes***

In a few weeks, NATIONAL REVIEW will have available a few completely indexed bound volumes covering the period from the founding of the magazine in November 1955, through the issue of May 16, 1956 (Volume I); and from the issue of May 23 through December 1956 (Volume II). Each volume will sell for \$20—\$35 for the two. The supply is limited. Please enter your orders, which will be accepted first come first served, as soon as possible. Orders will be acknowledged immediately, and the volumes will be sent to you as soon as they are available.

NATIONAL REVIEW will also have available, in a few weeks, individual indexes for the first two volumes. The indexes are complete, and are about 16 pages each in length. They sell for 75 cents apiece. Orders cannot be acknowledged, but the indexes will be sent out as soon as they are available.



# NATIONAL TRENDS

L. BRENT BOZELL

## *Testimony on the Great Conspiracy*

Last week the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security called Frank Meyer of NATIONAL REVIEW as an expert witness, to explain the significance of the line taken by the recent convention of the Communist Party of the United States. This Mr. Meyer did, but not before he had alerted the Committee to a couple of other matters that may help to explain why the free world has found itself unable, over the past two decades, to offer purposeful opposition to the Soviet Union.

For one thing, he nailed down a story that has been batting around Washington for some years now, but never before confirmed—that Earl Browder, former head of the U. S. Communist Party, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, former President of the United States, maintained a surreptitious liaison.

The link between Browder and Roosevelt was Josephine Truslow Adams, a co-worker and confidant of Mr. Meyer in the latter's Communist years. "Josie" Adams, Mr. Meyer revealed, first approached Roosevelt during the prewar years as a pleader for Browder, then sitting in jail as the result of a passport fraud. Browder, thanks in part at least to Miss Adams' intervention, was freed. But that was not the end of it. For Roosevelt had taken a liking to Josie Adams, and in the years that followed right down to his death, she was in and out of the President's parlor just as often as she wished to be—and in the role, well understood by all concerned, of Earl Browder's emissary.

Josie Adams, as it turned out, had already testified in an executive session of the Committee to the facts related by Mr. Meyer; and her story, which was thereupon placed on the public record, substantiated his. What is more, Committee Counsel Robert Morris advised the Committee that he had been authorized by Earl Browder himself to say that Josie Adams had given an accurate account.

Mr. Meyer made clear that there

was a good deal more involved in this relationship than an attempt by Roosevelt to forward his domestic political purposes through an understanding with the U. S. Communist Party. It was, first of all, a Communist operation designed to influence the President on immediate issues. It was also, as Mr. Meyer put it, "a continuing political conversation"—a theoretical and philosophical relationship designed to convince the late President that the Communist Party and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the New Deal on the other, were moving in the same direction—toward "democratic socialism." This analysis, Mr. Meyer was advised by Miss Adams, Roosevelt largely accepted.

The other matter that raised eyebrows in the Committee room was Mr. Meyer's account of his activities as a student organizer in England. As secretary of the Student Bureau of the British Communist Party from 1932 to 1934, Mr. Meyer headed a group of some four or five hundred Communist university students: 80 were at Oxford, 100 at Cambridge. It is reasonable to assume that a fair number of those Communist students have remained Communists. And considering the role of Oxford and Cambridge in British society, it follows that Britain may need McCarthyism today even more than the United States does.

A further item in Mr. Meyer's English experience is worth noting. While a student at the London School of Economics, he ran for the presidency of the student governing body as an open Communist, but on the united front ticket. The decisive element in swinging Mr. Meyer's election was a group of Indian nationalists dominated by an underground unit of the Indian Communist Party. The spokesman for that Indian "nationalist" front was Mr. Krishna Menon, the present Indian Ambassador to the UN.

Turning to the question of current Communist tactics and strategy,

Mr. Meyer advised the Committee:

1. The current line for Communist Parties all over the world, including the CPUSA, is the "20th Congress line." Mr. Khrushchev's report to that Congress spelled out the essential points: the world Communist movement is on the strategic offense against the free world; "soft" tactics are called for under the circumstances—i.e., peaceful, parliamentary means will serve to accomplish a revolutionary transformation in countries where Communist influence is advanced (although violent revolution will be required where capitalist resistance remains strong): greater internal flexibility within Communist parties is desirable—i.e., differences on non-basic, non-theoretical matters should be publicly aired ("the de-Stalinization campaign" is both example and precept).

2. In the Soviet Union itself, and in the national parties generally, three "factions" have appeared: unreconstructed Stalinists, "liberalizers," and—as the most numerous and the dominating group—a center, making slight concessions in both directions. This factionalism, however, is not nearly as severe as during the period 1925-29.

3. The recent convention of the CPUSA faithfully reflected the 20th Congress line, and permitted "flexibility." The unreconstructed Stalinists, led by Foster; "the liberalizers," led by Gates and the *Daily Worker* group; and a decisive center led by the bulk of the hard-core Communists, whose spokesman was Eugene Dennis, reached an agreement on all the fundamental questions. (Other evidence before the Committee indicated that directives from Moscow insisted upon the demonstration of a united position.) The Gates-type verbalizing was designed primarily to make a record for the courts.

4. The CPUSA reaffirmed that it was an integral part of the international Communist movement by reaffirming that it is a Marxist-Leninist party.

5. The convention took a stand on only one important question regarding an immediate program. It stressed that the main domestic aim of the Communists is to utilize the "integration" movement as the militant edge in cutting into the constitutional structure of the United States.

# An Open Letter to Dr. Oppenheimer

Who is Dr. Oppenheimer and Why? Perhaps he doesn't know himself. But Dr. Medford Evans, who is easily the world's greatest authority on the subject of Dr. Oppenheimer, tells him here

MEDFORD EVANS

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer  
Institute for Advanced Study  
Princeton, New Jersey

Dear Dr. Oppenheimer:

This letter is in three parts:

1. Statement of the hypothesis that you are patriotic and humanitarian, in spite of much circumstantial evidence to the contrary.

2. With this hypothesis, an explanation of your determined opposition in 1949-50 to U.S. development of the hydrogen bomb.

3. An exhortation that you now tell what you know of clandestine channels of atomic information and materials.

At this point you may not want to read further, but others may, and as this is an open letter I will continue. For the benefit of the others I will be explicit about several things which are no news to you. At the same time this is not a primer of atomic politics, and a degree of understanding of the great figure you cut in the Cold-War world will be taken for granted. I thought once to introduce myself, but it will be clear to you anyhow that I am some guy with just enough information to ask certain questions which you are the one man in all the world best qualified to answer.

For the curious and the skeptical, documentary notes are attached. [See page 235].

## I. HYPOTHESIS

Assume that you are not a dedicated Communist. Since you are, as Edward Teller observed, "complicated,"<sup>1</sup> you may not know yourself whether you are a dedicated Communist or not. Let us assume that you are not.

It is not an easy assumption. Wil-

liam Borden, Yale Law graduate whom the late Senator Brien McMahon picked to be Executive Director of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy—to supplant Fred Rhodes and Dave Teeple, who were considered too hipped on security—after five years in the political maelstrom created by the atom, emerged with a singular grasp of officially confidential data (AEC, FBI, congressional) and the stark conclusion: "More probably than not, J. Robert Oppenheimer is an agent of the Soviet Union."<sup>2</sup>

From the record now published, it was a prudent inference. Intellectually prudent, that is. Whether Borden was prudent to say it out loud is another matter. But what else is one to make of your conduct? What can be made of regular cash contributions to Communist causes all during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact? (That you so contributed is your own testimony,<sup>3</sup> not an accusation by enemies.) What do your friends have to say about that? (I will not say much about it here, either.)

On the other hand, if you were a dedicated Communist, would you not have done more damage to the United States than seems yet to have been done? After all, the Soviet Union has not yet cried to us, Checkmate! and if you were a Soviet agent how would it be possible for the Soviet Union to be militarily thwarted in anything? You were for seven years the key man in the American atomic energy project. The particular seven years I have in mind (1946-1952, inclusive) were Stalinist years in the Soviet Union. Beria was Stalin's man on the atom. If you were a Soviet agent you were Beria's man. Is it conceivable that Beria told you what to do? Dean Latimer did not think it conceivable that General Groves

told you what to do.<sup>4</sup> I do not think it easily conceivable that Beria told you what to do. I cannot see how he could impose discipline on you, and I cannot see you willingly submitting to his discipline. Or anyone else's, for that matter. After all, you had become the shatterer of worlds.<sup>5</sup> Who was Beria? Who was Stalin?

## As Old as Delphi

Let us assume that you are not a Soviet agent, not a dedicated Communist.

At first blush it is a comfortable assumption. But the comfort is short-lived. You are the emancipated new man, master of the new force; yet your characteristic style is as old as Delphi—with this difference: that where the oracle was ambiguous about the future, you are ambiguous about the past and the present.

Mere reticence is natural enough. After all, as you told the Gray Board: "Look, I have had a lot of secrets in my head a long time. It does not matter who I associate with. I don't talk about those secrets. Only a very skillful guy might pick up a trace of information as to where I had been or what I was up to."<sup>6</sup> This kind of sophistication has surely been useful to the United States now and then. We can hardly expect you to tell us, either, the whole truth. For one thing, as P.M.S. Blackett contended,<sup>7</sup> there isn't time for that.

What is tantalizing is that you so often drop clues. Or so it seems. Perhaps they are apples for Atalanta. I think they are clues. For example, in 1947 you made a speech before a committee of the UN, and quite gratuitously you said—the context concerns the difficulties of disseminating scientific information—"It requires instruction, it requires work to get an under-



standing of these things abroad. I know this from experience. I know it is not enough to tell someone a secret: it is very hard to give away a secret. You have to work at it week after week after week because these things are complex."<sup>8</sup> Now why in the world would you say a thing like that?

Is Truth a mistress whom you will not marry but cannot leave alone?

### The Case of Eldred Nelson

Do you remember when, during the 1954 hearings on your AEC security clearance, counsel for the government read to you a transcript of a wartime interview between you and General Groves' security officer? In that interview (September 12, 1943) Colonel Lansdale told you that he had "reason to believe that you yourself [had been] . . . felt out . . . to ascertain how you felt about . . . passing a little information to the party."<sup>9</sup>

If any such attempt was made, you told Lansdale, "it was so gentle I did not know it."

Then Lansdale tried to get you to name some acquaintance who might logically have been suspected of making some such attempt.

"There is," you said, "a girl called Eldred Nelson." An odd thing for you to say to a Colonel of Military Intelligence in 1943.

In 1954 you emphasized to Roger Robb, counsel for the Government Board, how odd it had been. "Eldred Nelson," you assured Robb, "is not a girl. He is not a Communist."<sup>10</sup> Transcripts, of course, are liable to error, but stenographers seldom supply a name like "Eldred."

"Is it now clear to you," asked Robb, "who Colonel Lansdale was talking about?"

"I don't know," you replied. "It might well be Steve Nelson."

"Isn't that pretty plain?"


"Yes."

"Why didn't you mention Steve Nelson?"

"I seem to have mentioned a Nelson."<sup>11</sup>

Bizarre!

Facing down a police officer, you withhold the name of Steve Nelson (you are later to tell Robb: "I knew he was a Communist and an important Communist").<sup>12</sup> Then, gratuitously, you introduce the name of Eldred Nelson (you will tell Robb: "He was



**"Be emphatic about Witch Hunts, McCarthyism, Guilt-by-Association, Police State Methods, Climate of Fear, Reign of Terror, Abridgement of Academic Freedom, and Thought Control. Be vague about Hiss, Greenglass, Gold, Fuchs, Remington, Rosenberg, White, Coe, Eisler, Oppenheimer, Lattimore, Sobell, Ware, Silvermaster and Coplon."**

a student of mine. . . . He was not a Communist"<sup>13</sup> (It does you little good, it does Eldred Nelson little harm (so far as we know), by itself it causes Lansdale little trouble. But it looks like involving the innocent to protect the guilty. Is this what your admirers have in mind when they call you seer and saint?<sup>14</sup> Perhaps so. Loyalty to Steve (you were to say: "He and my wife . . . had close affectionate relationships and I was a natural bystander"<sup>15</sup>) made you furnish Lansdale the wrong given name; compassion for Eldred made you, to throw the police off his track, lie about his gender; but intellectual honesty dictated the correct surname. *Magna est veritas et praevalerebit!* "I seem to have mentioned a Nelson."

"I would suppose," George Kennan observes, "that you might just as well have asked Leonardo da Vinci to distort an anatomical drawing as that you should ask Robert Oppenheimer to speak . . . to the sort of questions we were talking about and speak dishonestly."<sup>16</sup>

Superficially, Kennan sounds absurd; for the ordinary supposition would be that if you wanted an anatomical drawing distorted no one

could do it more artfully than Leonardo could have done it. Yet there is an odd felicity in comparing the prodigious and inscrutable painter of Mona Lisa—the military engineer of Caesar Borgia—with the brilliant director of the laboratory where the first atomic bombs were made, and resolute opponent of the manufacture of hydrogen bombs.

Kennan may have been right, too, in thinking that you have an ineradicable streak of honesty. Typically, your speech is an elaborate cryptogram. The tissue of lies is shot through with truth. Similarly with your conduct. In the role of Soviet agent you are almost totally convincing. Yet a stubborn loyalty to the United States apparently persists. You have certainly confused us, but it is almost uproarious to think how you must have baffled the Comrades. Otto John is a piker. For he is frivolous. You are serious. Or so it seems.

I am going to assume that, complicated as you are, you are primarily patriotic and humanitarian.

## II. EXPLANATION

Why did you so energetically oppose the hydrogen bomb program in 1949-50? This question was explored in the hearings before the Gray Board with metaphysical thoroughness and inconclusiveness. Your friends have assumed that you were moved by two considerations: 1) that the U.S. was adequately armed without the H-bomb, and 2) that the use of an H-bomb would actually be just too terrible, that the A-bomb, through which you had already "known sin," was at least enough for the consciences of yourself, your fellow scientists, and the rest of us. Your friends have thought you fully justified in holding such views, whether you were objectively correct or not (assuming that there is here any such thing as objective correctness), and they have further thought it unfair to you and dangerous to all concerned that you should in any way be "put on trial" for having expressed such views, merely because they turned out to be counter to the official policy eventually adopted.

Your critics, in contrast, have thought that your friends have somehow missed the whole point, for to these critics the point at issue in the



whole H-bomb business as it related to you was simply whether your advice had been sincere. Of course, they would say, there is no question but that an expert, such as Doctor Oppenheimer, must advise the Government in the light of his best professional judgment, whether it is what the Government wants to hear or not; and if the expert turns out at some future date to have been wrong, certainly he should not be punished for a fallibility common to all men. But what an expert is not supposed to do (they would say) is to give advice which, ostensibly in the interest of one country, is secretly intended to help another.

If I honestly think the gun is not loaded, and tell my friend it is not, then I am not guilty of homicide when he blows his brains out with it. But suppose I really know it is loaded, and yet tell him it is not? From the point of view of a third party the whole question of my guilt or innocence turns not on what I said but on what I was thinking when I said it. This is a very tough sort of question for a third party to answer. No wonder the Gray Board had a tough time with it; and no wonder the Atomic Energy Commission waived it in reaching a decision on your clearance.

### *The Chevalier Incident*

Maybe we should let the whole matter stay dropped, but I think I have a new angle which, if it is right, has practical consequences. Perhaps you were neither offering straightforward though mistaken advice (as your friends claim) nor just deliberately giving us a bum steer (as your enemies have suspected). You gave advice which on the surface was wrong, and which was duly rejected; but it may have included, well obscured, some extremely valuable truths. You knew something you would not tell, and you told something that wasn't so, but what you told could lead to what you knew.

The pattern appears in what you told the Gray Board about a now famous but still obscure incident in 1943, when your friend Haakon Chevalier, then professor of French at Berkeley, approached you somehow on the general subject of giving information to the Soviets via one

George Eltenton, a mysterious Britisher who subsequently disappeared. When at length you reported this attempt at espionage to the proper authorities, you not only withheld Chevalier's name, but also, you say now, gratuitously introduced an extraordinary quantity of false and misleading information.

The story I told to [Colonel Boris T.] Pash [in 1943 Military Counter-intelligence Chief in the San Francisco area] was not a true story . . . the story told in circumstantial detail, and which was elicited from me in greater and greater detail . . . was a false story. It is not easy to say that.

Now, when you ask for a more persuasive argument as to why I did this than that I was an idiot, I am going to have more trouble being understandable.

I think I was impelled by 2 or 3 concerns at that time. One was the feeling that I must get across the fact that if there was, as Lansdale indicated, trouble at the Radiation Laboratory, Eltenton was the guy that might very well be involved and it was serious. Whether I embroidered the story in order to underline that seriousness or whether I embroidered it to make it more tolerable that I would not tell the simple facts, namely, Chevalier had talked to me about it, I don't know. . . .

I think I need to say that it was essential that I tell this story, that I should have told it at once and I should have told it completely accurately, but that it was a matter of conflict for me and I found myself, I believe, trying to give a tip to the intelligence people without realizing that when you give a tip you must tell the whole story. When I was asked to elaborate, I started off on a false pattern.<sup>17</sup>

The italics, of course, are mine. I suggest that, in a man who has a feeling that he must get across a fact and who at the same time will not tell the simple facts, the tension may persist until it becomes a characteristic intellectual and moral posture—undeniable except for one whose intellectual and moral fibre is of superior toughness, and damaging even to him.

I suggest that in the debate over the hydrogen bomb program in 1949-50 you were—as in the Chevalier case in 1943, but on a larger scale—trying to give a tip to the intelligence people without realizing that when you give a tip you must tell the whole story.

What tip?

Here is what Dr. Luis Alvarez

testified you told him one day near the end of October 1949, when you took him and Doctor Serber to lunch at "a small restaurant in the immediate neighborhood of the Commission building."<sup>18</sup> (Would that have been Rich's?)

He [i.e., you, Oppenheimer] said that he did not think the United States should build the hydrogen bomb, and the main reason that he gave for this if my memory serves me correctly, and I think it does, was that if we built a hydrogen bomb, then the Russians would build a hydrogen bomb, whereas if we did not build a hydrogen bomb, then the Russians would not build a hydrogen bomb.<sup>19</sup>

I don't think your friends—or critics either—have taken you seriously enough. Doctor Alvarez went on to tell the Gray Board, "I found this such an odd point of view that I don't understand it to this day,"<sup>20</sup> and his reaction is typical of practically all those who for one reason or another will not go along with Borden's painful conjecture that you are a Soviet agent, but who also esteem you quite a bit this side of idolatry. These sane, shrewd people conclude, in effect, that this is just one of those screwball things that a noble, difficult genius like Oppenheimer will do or say every now and then. I suggest that in this case you meant what you said, and that you knew what you were talking about.

### *All but the Obvious*

The reason why your arguments against the hydrogen bomb have probably been taken too lightly is that when you said, *If we build a hydrogen bomb then the Russians will build a hydrogen bomb, whereas if we do not build a hydrogen bomb, then the Russians will not build a hydrogen bomb*, your critics assumed that you meant that Russian decisions would be controlled by our action. I suggest that you had in mind that Russian capacity would be so controlled. The argument that whether the Russians would want an H-bomb or not depended on whether we had one first was extremely unconvincing, and since that is the way your argument was interpreted you did not win the debate. Had you said plainly: *Look, they can't possibly make an H-bomb in Russia unless we make one here first; but if we do make one here, then*

we can't possibly keep them from getting it too; they depend on us that much, they are tied to us that close—had you said something like that, the debate might have gone a different way. Perhaps you thought, Surely they can see that for themselves, at least with the hints I have given! However, we have been credulous of everything but the obvious.

### Hints and Hedging

You have given hints repeatedly. In the post-mortem before the Gray Board in 1954 you said:

The notion that the thermonuclear arms race was something that was in the interests of this country to avoid if it could was very clear to us [General Advisory Committee] in 1949. . . . We thought it was something to avoid even if we could jump the gun by a couple of years, or even if we could outproduce the enemy, because we were infinitely more vulnerable and infinitely less likely to initiate the use of these weapons. . . . This is an idea which I believe is still right, but I think what was not clear to us then and what is clearer to me now is that it probably lay wholly beyond our power to prevent the Russians somehow from getting ahead with it. I think if we could have taken any action at that time which would have precluded their development of this weapon, it would have been a very good bet to take that. . . . I believe that *their atomic effort was quite imitative* and that made it quite natural for us to think that *their thermonuclear work would be quite imitative* and that we should not set the pace in this development.<sup>21</sup>

Again you said:

I think we were right in believing that any method available consistent with honor and security for *keeping these objects out of the arsenals of the enemy* would have been a good course to follow.<sup>22</sup>

To me these look like hints. I understand that later in the hearing Gordon Gray picked you up on this very matter, and you hedged a bit. As follows:

GRAY: Is it your opinion, Doctor, that the Russians would not have sought to develop a hydrogen bomb unless they knew in one way or another . . . that this country was proceeding with it?

OPPENHEIMER: That was my opinion in 1949. . . .

GRAY: . . . Would it not have been reasonable to expect . . . that they

General Groves said that Russia didn't seem to appreciate the effect of the A-bomb at Hiroshima until after Bikini, when "the Russian observers who were there against my wishes" got ashore again at San Francisco and went to the Russian consulate. And within twenty-four hours the attitude of the Russian delegate at the UN "changed completely." Maybe the great bureaucracy had been simply filing the spies' reports and ignoring them.

ISABEL PATERSON

National Review, May 23, 1956

would do anything to increase their military strength?

OPPENHEIMER: Right.

GRAY: Whatever it might be.

OPPENHEIMER: Oh, sure.

GRAY: So you don't intend to have this record suggest that you felt that if those who opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb prevailed that would mean that the world would not be confronted with the hydrogen bomb?

OPPENHEIMER: It would not necessarily mean—we thought on the whole it would make it less likely. That the Russians would attempt and less likely that they would succeed in the undertaking.

GRAY: . . . That is two things. One, the likelihood of their success would we all hope still be related to their own capabilities and not to information they would receive from our efforts. So what you mean to say is that since they would not attempt it they would not succeed?

OPPENHEIMER: No. [I believe this the most ambiguous flat No I ever read.] I believe what we then thought was that the incentive to do it would be far greater if they knew we were doing it, and we had succeeded. Let me, for instance, take a conjecture. Suppose we had not done anything about the atom during the war. I don't think you could guarantee that the Russians would never have had an atomic bomb. But I believe they would not have one nearly as soon as they have. I think both the fact of our success, the immense amount of publicity, the prestige of the weapon, the espionage they collect, all of this made it an absolutely higher priority thing, and we thought similar circumstances might apply to the hydrogen bomb. We were always clear that there might be a Russian effort whatever we did. We always understood that if we did not do this that an attempt would be made to get the Russians sewed up so that they would not either.<sup>23</sup>

So Gray took the hint just about as I am taking it now, and when he put it to you if that was what you meant, you backed down a bit, but not completely. You would naturally back down some, unless you were ready to go pretty far the other way. It would startle you to have Gray pick you up like that. It startled you enough so that you proceeded to fumble a related question. At least it looks like a fumble:

GRAY: . . . at what time did your strong moral convictions develop with respect to the hydrogen bomb?

OPPENHEIMER: When it became clear to me that we would tend to use any weapon we had.<sup>24</sup>

Now you had said, you know (see above), that "we were infinitely more vulnerable and infinitely less likely to initiate the use of these weapons." There is some difficulty in reconciling the two contentions: 1) that the tendency of the U.S. to use any weapon it might acquire created a moral objection to helping it acquire an H-bomb, and 2) that the small likelihood that the U.S. would use such a weapon as an H-bomb ("infinitely less" than the likelihood that the adversary would use it) would put the U.S. at a dangerous military disadvantage if H-bombs were acquired all round.

I will not press that. Nobody expects Euclidean consistency out of the Delphic Oracle.

### Patriotic Impulse

I suggest, Doctor Oppenheimer, that you knew 1) that the USSR was technologically incapable of the independent production of nuclear weapons, and 2) that the U.S.A. was psychologically incapable of effective internal security.

I suggest that you sincerely did not want the United States to develop a weapon which you knew the Soviet Union would and could immediately steal (but could get in no other way), but that you were also unwilling to reveal what it was that made you so sure that Soviet Russia was in a position to steal it.

I suggest that you knew a great deal about the channels by which information and materials were transferred from the U.S.A. to the USSR. You did not want to reveal those channels to the American government



or the American public—just as you once did not want to give **Chevalier's** name to General Groves—but you did have the patriotic impulse to prevent, if possible, our ever putting into the channels to Soviet Russia *information and materials of a new order of danger.*

You were like an embezzler's wife who will not denounce her husband to the authorities, but earnestly urges his employer not to enlarge his department.

### "Scorpions in a Bottle"

Perhaps you have been misunderstood because of the same interference that jams my own attempts to get through to the public consciousness—a massive public preconception that Soviet Russia has a great atomic energy project of its own. Sure, it will be granted, Fuchs and the Rosenbergs made possible the Russian accomplishment and that was a terrible thing, but it is spilled milk now and we just have to set our jaws, tighten our belts, and pray for peace. Everyone knows that the Soviets have tested many atomic and hydrogen weapons, that while they are probably behind us in total stockpile the numbers on both sides are so great it hardly matters, that in certain respects they may have moved ahead of us (for example, they may have dropped an H-bomb from an airplane before we did), that on the whole the situation can be described as an "atomic stalemate," that the U.S.A. and the USSR are, in your own vivid phrase, like "two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life."<sup>25</sup>

What people do not seem to know, however, is that when you used that image you did not say that the U.S.A. and the USSR had arrived at the stage where they were like two scorpions in a bottle; you said the time *might* come when they would be. (You said this on February 17, 1953. Perhaps you think that time has now come.)

In 1953 you very carefully estimated that "*the USSR is about four years behind us. . . the scale of its operations is not as big as ours was four years ago. It may be something like half as big as ours then was.*"<sup>26</sup> You, naturally, thought this was bad enough. "*The very least we can con-*

*clude,*" you said, "*is that our twenty-thousandth bomb . . . will not in any deep strategic sense offset their two-thousandth.*"<sup>27</sup> This suggests that you thought of us as having a ten-to-one superiority in productivity.

What seems to be unknown is that you—who are our chief authority on the meaning of the scientific evidence concerning Soviet nuclear developments—have never said flatly that the Soviet atomic project is independently formidable. Through you, others have been persuaded to believe that it is independently formidable. They have been persuaded to believe much more than you are committed by the record to uphold. The effect is that of an advertisement in which the advantages of, say, the Tucker automobile are strikingly set forth, while some-



where in the fine print is a statement that nothing is actually in production. The majority of readers overlook the fine print.

Forensically, you have left an overwhelming impression of Soviet achievement; academically, you have been explicit in your reservations, have unobtrusively hedged the bet.

In September 1949 it was you who told the Pentagon and the Congressional Joint Committee the meaning of the reported Soviet explosion—quickly dubbed "Operation Joe." You were the principal expert in a panel of four. "We went over [the evidence of the Soviet explosion] very carefully and it was very clear to us that this was the real thing, and there was not any doubt about it. . . This was an atomic bomb."<sup>28</sup>

Yet three and a half years later you were to say of the then much larger volume of scientific evidence concerning Soviet atomic activities: "*We do need one word of warning: This is evidence which could well be evidence of what the government of the USSR wants us to think, rather than evidence of what is true.*"<sup>29</sup> Well, of course, what we the American people think—two scorpions and all—is what the Soviet rulers want us to think.

Why do we think as we do on this subject? Largely because of you, it appears. Indeed you tempt one to the great-man theory of history. Dean Latimer said of you, "I have seen him sway audiences. It was just marvelous, the phraseology and the influence is just tremendous."<sup>30</sup>

"I went over to the State Department," you told the Gray Board, "where the question was being discussed . . . should this [reported Soviet atomic explosion] be publicly announced by the President and I gave some arguments in favor of that. . . I was taken up to hearings before the Joint Congressional Committee. . . They were quite skeptical and I was not allowed to tell them the evidence. . . All I could do was just sound as serious and convinced and certain about it as I knew how. I think by the time we left, the Joint Congressional Committee understood that this event had been real."<sup>31</sup> Evidently the phraseology was sufficiently marvelous.

### A Later Reservation

Yet again, three and a half years later you were to qualify your estimate of Soviet atomic achievement with the reservation: "This [estimate] is consistent with the facts known to us. It has not been proven by them, by any means."<sup>32</sup> The little phrase which I have italicized seems to me in its own quiet way to be as startling as Harry Truman's declaration,<sup>33</sup> (which you deplored<sup>34</sup>) that he doubted whether the Russians had a workable A-bomb.

You have convinced the United States government and the American people that the Soviet atomic project is independently formidable, but apparently you have not fully convinced yourself.

Why have your reservations and



warnings about the inconclusiveness of the evidence in this area been so largely ignored? I don't suppose you understand that either. Sometimes people believe because they do not want to believe.

Nobody seems to have thought much about the fact that David Lilienthal, AEC Chairman at the time of the H-bomb debate, testified during your 1954 security hearing that, regarding "possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Russians" . . . "there were no intelligence reports that I can recall."<sup>35</sup> This suggests that the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had no positive information about the Russian plant which might have been supposed to have produced the Russian A-bomb. For if he had known anything about their A-bomb plant, as distinct from the bomb itself, then he would have known something about their H-bomb capability, just as, knowing something about our plant, he knew something of our capability.

### *A Counsel of Prudence*

Excuse my repetitiousness, but what are we to make of the fact that these three men—1) Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, official source of the world news in 1949 that an atomic explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union, 2) David E. Lilienthal, Chairman of the AEC, government agency under which the scientific analysis of the evidence of all such explosions was conducted, and 3) you, J. Robert Oppenheimer, leading scientific adviser to both Truman and Lilienthal—have all made statements since 1949 casting doubt on the validity of what was officially said in 1949?

Is it not true—I think you would know—that for the past seven and a half years top American officials have based their working estimates of Russian nuclear capability, and their public statements about such estimates, on a certain kind of "counsel of prudence" rather than on complete, verified data? And is it not true that to whatever degree you have yourself been responsible for their having such an attitude, you nevertheless could have had, and did have, in your own mind an altogether different picture of the situation in the Soviet Union?

No doubt you were faced, briefly, with the same contradictory thoughts that puzzled others: 1) the improbability that Russia had the industrial capacity required to make an A-bomb—"machine tools . . . production of electronic control equipment, capacity to produce certain chemicals with the desired degree of purity, and things of that sort," the late Karl Compton explained to the Gray Board<sup>36</sup>—versus 2) the evidence that nevertheless an atomic explosion *had* occurred.

The situation, you saw, was not to be explained by the simple disjunctive implied in such arguments as:

"You say they can't make an A-bomb, but I know they've got an A-bomb, so you must be wrong."

Or:

"You say they have an A-bomb, but I know they can't make an A-bomb, so you must be wrong."

Your own flexible imagination would quickly see another alternative:

"They can't make an A-bomb, but they've got an A-bomb—so they must have swiped it."

I know it is not easy to swipe an A-bomb. They would have had to work at it week after week after week because these things are complex. But it could be done.

I suggest that when you concluded in September 1949 that the Soviets had indeed exploded an A-bomb, you knew then that they must have

The three wise men assigned to probe the Oppenheimer case were not even commissioned to look into the real scandal: that for eight decisive years our government was turning to nuclear physicists for guidance, not on technical details of atomic science, but on the very essence of grand strategy and national policies. Yet no dereliction Professor Oppenheimer might possibly be found guilty of can compare with the monstrous shame of statesmen who have invited atom-pushers into the highest policy councils of the nation.

WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM  
U.S.A., May 17, 1954

a pipe line—a damned good pipe line—to the American project. This would be consistent with what you knew of Communist methods (ingenious, thorough, unscrupulous) and American habits (careless, optimistic, naive).

### *Channels of Espionage*

As the former director of Los Alamos you knew that nuclear bombs are assembled from components manufactured in every part of the United States. If such components can be transported so far they can be transported farther.

As a former intimate of Communists and a continuing intimate of former Communists, you knew of Communist channels through Mexico to Europe. Isaac Folkoff, a Communist "treasurer of something" you called him, explained to you in 1940 (you told the Gray Board) "all the business about the refugees, the camps in France, the resettlement problems, and how much it cost and how much it cost to get to Mexico, and all the rest."<sup>37</sup>

And you knew New Mexico. "In 1929," you said of your brother Frank and yourself, "we rented a little ranch up in the high mountains in New Mexico which we have had ever since, and we used to spend as much time there as we could in the summer. . . . It was a very primitive sort of establishment. . . . We spent part of the summer of 1941 together at the ranch. . . . That was after my marriage. He [Frank] and his wife stayed on a while."<sup>38</sup> In 1943, you said "Groves sent an engineer around to look for a place [for a bomb laboratory]. He was around in the Southwest where I knew the country and in New Mexico, and I showed him and showed General Groves the city of Los Alamos."<sup>39</sup>

With your intimate knowledge of the process, the organization, and the geography, you were in a position to realize, the moment it became clear in September 1949 that the Soviets had exploded an A-bomb years ahead of cautious estimates, not that you and Compton and others had been wrong about the stage at which Soviet development had arrived, but that you had not given full credit to the Soviet underground. Now you knew that the Communist underground railway could carry freight as well as passen-

gers. (We Americans are preoccupied with the theft of information data. Materials, to the Soviet mentality, are presumably more important. And in this case, almost as compact.) You knew better than anyone else how worthless the Manhattan District-AEC system of materials-accounting had been, so that no one could know by checking the inventory whether anything had been stolen or not.

More sophisticated than bomb physicist Robert Bacher,<sup>40</sup> you probably would not have been, as he said he was, "very deeply shocked to find how few atomic weapons we had at that time [December 1946]."<sup>41</sup>

What *did* happen to all that stuff they made at Oak Ridge in 1946? It was supposed to go into bombs at Los Alamos. According to Dr. Bacher, not much of it did.

### *Diversion of Material*

Well, I suppose we shall never know. For in 1946 nobody was trying very hard to keep track of the stuff. I remember an old Trotskyite at Oak Ridge (I don't mean an aged Trotskyite; just a guy who had formerly passed for a Trotskyite, though actually some of the 4th International boys thought he was a Stalinist spy in their midst)—I remember how in dire tones he warned a group of young scientists (this was at a meeting in one of the Roane-Anderson buildings near the Central Bus Terminal) never to trust the U.S. Army. For the Army, he said, was undoubtedly *secreting quantities of U-235 and plutonium* in order to avoid turning them over to the forthcoming civilian agency, as it was supposed to do.

That is not too plausible, is it, that the Army would do that? But the old Trotskyite at least knew that *any such diversion of material by anybody at that time would hardly be detected*. For he was a sharp mathematician, and himself worked on accountability for fissionable materials at the gaseous diffusion plant. You would probably recognize his name if I gave it. He has written for the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. He left Oak Ridge, later tried to come back, fortunately (I think) didn't make it.

Then I remember one week-end in the spring of 1947 when an AEC ac-

During 1950 Dr. Oppenheimer testified to the FBI that, although he was in the habit of giving some monthly contributions to the Communist Party, he had a change of mind about the policies of the Soviet Union, and "at the time of the Finnish War and the subsequent break between Germany and Russia in 1941 realized the Communist infiltration tactics into the alleged anti-Fascist groups and became fed up with the whole thing and lost what little interest he had."

The board established, on the other hand, "by testimony and other information," that "Dr. Oppenheimer made periodic contributions through Communist Party functionaries to the Communist Party . . . in amounts aggregating not less than \$500 and not more than \$1,000 a year during a period of approximately four years ending in April 1942," and that "as of April 1942 Dr. Oppenheimer had for several months been participating in government atomic energy research activities."

MAX EASTMAN

The Freeman, June 28, 1954

countant from the production division came to my house in Oak Ridge to get advice on how to draw up an organization chart for the brand-new materials-accounting branch.

Three years and some months later, when I was working in the Washington AEC office, I remember a "management improvement" report coming in from Los Alamos to the effect that procedures developed by that materials-accounting branch and approved by the Commission in 1948 were being duly installed at Los Alamos—in July 1950.

That was about the same time the FBI arrested Dr. Sanford Simons in Denver for illegal possession of plutonium which he had taken out of Los Alamos in 1946.<sup>42</sup> I don't know how they caught him. Probably a confidential informant. Not through the Los Alamos inventory system, I'm sure. As I recall, he got eighteen months.

Of course that fellow who stole the gold from Los Alamos in 1952 got a

stiffer sentence. I believe he is still at Leavenworth. If he hadn't run into difficulties trying to fence the stuff—Treasury men and city detectives stumbled on his track in Oklahoma City in 1954—he would have made a clean break. Los Alamos never knew they had been robbed till Treasury caught the guy. He himself had worked in materials-accounting, and when he quit his job in 1952 he walked off with 110 ounces of pure gold bullion which according to his books was an overage, and he was too embarrassed to turn it back in. Nobody missed it.<sup>43</sup> What a joint!

### *Case of the English Teacher*

Flash back to 1948—the AEC materials-accounting representative at Los Alamos then was a former high-school English teacher. Since, as your successor as Laboratory Director, Dr. Norris Bradbury, told the Joint Committee, "the problem of accounting for so-called S.F. [source and fissionable] materials is a very complicated and technical problem,"<sup>44</sup> the young man was clearly over his head. Nor could he turn to the excellent scientific personnel on Dr. Bradbury's own staff, for they were, Dr. Bradbury told the Committee, "doing all in our power to handle this question to the satisfaction of the Commission,"<sup>45</sup> i.e., the young English teacher.

Then the young man got a boss—a pretty high-powered accountant who went out to New Mexico from the AEC office in Washington. In Washington this man had distinguished himself by hiring as one of his two main assistants a former understudy in the bureaucracy of—guess who?—Nathan Gregory Silvermaster! Now don't misunderstand me. I am not a guilt-by-association man. As a matter of fact, I had some association with the protégé of Silvermaster myself. And I am not guilty of any kind of pro-Communist activity. But I think all of us ought to be investigated most thoroughly. I had another acquaintance in AEC who went to Colombia to work with Lauchlin Currie. It's a small world.

The reason why personnel is so important is the inherent difficulty of materials control. Your friend Walter Zinn, the great reactor expert, testified during the Hickenlooper Investi-



gation, "... if you cannot have people who you are confident will not do this filching . . . your inventories cannot control the situation."<sup>46</sup>

A few days later Dr. C. E. Larson and Mr. Jesse Herndon, Oak Ridge Laboratory Director and Electromagnetic Plant Superintendent respectively, testified before the Committee. Dr. Larson spoke of their use at that time of the polygraph (lie detector), and added, "... if we agree that the polygraph is not valid and the amount concerned is within our limit of error . . . we would never catch it."<sup>47</sup>

Mr. Herndon said, "This brings us right back to the personal integrity of the individual involved. If you don't have that, you don't have security."<sup>48</sup>

### *That Famous Article*

But you know more about all this than anybody else. That is what gives so much weight to your words in the famous article in *Foreign Affairs*, where you speak of a time when "there will have been . . . a vast accumulation of materials for atomic weapons, and a troublesome margin of uncertainty with regard to its accounting."<sup>49</sup>

Naturally, you were not inclined to discuss these things fully with anyone. You were in large measure to blame—at least as much as any single other person—for the failure in materials-accounting. You knew that some of your friends would be caught up in any complete investigation into such an operation. More poignantly, you did not know which friends *might* be involved in something worse than negligence.

Against all this, however, you now knew that if the U.S. developed a new weapon the USSR would get its share of the product, and you knew that if the new weapon were a hydrogen bomb then even a small share could be catastrophic.

Serious as the Russian A-bomb was, it was by no means decisive. In June 1949 Senator McMahon had asked you: "One final question, Doctor. Are you satisfied with our weapon progress since the end of the war?"<sup>50</sup> And you had replied, "It is my business not to be satisfied, but I am . . . it is far better than I thought it would be."<sup>51</sup> Evidently we had a rather large number of A-bombs. And the

Russians—concerning whom the issue was whether they had any at all—certainly did not have many.

Assuming that the Soviets would never have had any A-bombs if we had not made some first, it could be contended that by developing the A-bomb we had actually increased the danger to this country. For that development you shared responsibility. Yet it could also be argued that so long as we retained a runaway numerical superiority in A-bombs, our advantage would remain decisive. The number of A-bombs required to saturate the military objectives of a major power looked larger every day, and unless or until the Soviet Union achieved such a saturation number the power of restraint would remain in American hands.

With H-bombs the situation would be radically altered. The saturation number of these cannot be very large. Assume a U.S. superiority of 10 to 1

in either kind of bomb. Assume further (we observed above that you have implicitly made assumptions like these) that a great power can use many thousands of A-bombs (kiloton range) in a war, but never needs more than 15 or 20 (megaton range) H-bombs. The bottleneck in A-bomb military power is, then, production; the bottleneck with H-bombs is development. You told the Gray Board: "We could have had the atom bomb as far as ideas went considerably earlier than we could have had it as far as hardware went. . . . With the hydrogen bomb I believe that the pacing factor was good ideas."<sup>52</sup>

### *1949: U. S. Superiority*

Now go back to September 1949. Though A-bombs now evidently existed on both sides, yet it was clearly going to be a long time before Soviet Russia would catch up with the



Kreuttner

"It isn't that we scientists think we're better than other people. It's just that we're in a good position to make things pretty uncomfortable for everybody if we don't get the privileges and immunities we're after!"



United States in production, a usefully long time before the Soviet Union would have thousands of A-bombs—and this was true whether they made them or swiped them. Throughout that long time the U.S. numerical superiority (10 to 1 or whatever) would be an effective deterrent. But once the “good ideas” for making an H-bomb jelled and were tested, it would probably not take the U.S. long to produce two or three hundred. If in this comparatively brief interval the USSR produced or swiped even ten or fifteen, then you would find your two scorpions in the bottle.

Your colleague, the late Dr. John von Neumann (subsequently AEC Commissioner), told the Gray Board what he thought your views had been in 1949—“that we practically had the lead in whatever we did, and the Russians would follow, and that we were probably more vulnerable than they were for a variety of reasons, one of which is that we can probably saturate them right now—I meant right then—whereas they could not at that moment. Therefore a large increment on both sides would merely mean that both sides can saturate the other.”<sup>53</sup>

*And here is the turn of the screw, the fact that in clandestine methods of delivery the Soviet Union would clearly have the advantage.*

Clandestine methods of delivery would not only (as E. U. Condon says) “provide the pinpoint accuracy that long-range weapons may possibly lack,”<sup>54</sup> they might even—it seemed in 1949—be the only methods available. As you wrote “Uncle Jim” Conant, “I am not sure the miserable thing will work, nor that it can be gotten to a target except by ox cart.”<sup>55</sup> Or, perhaps—to use Condon again—“in the hold of a ship floating idly at the Brooklyn docks.”<sup>56</sup>

No wonder you wrote Conant that for the U.S. to become committed to the hydrogen bomb “as the way to save the country and the peace appears to me full of dangers.” No wonder you told Teller to keep his shirt on.<sup>57</sup> No wonder you persuaded Rabi and Serber to reconsider their initial enthusiasm for an H-bomb as the answer to “Joe One”<sup>58</sup> (the first atomic explosion in the Soviet Union).

It was precisely “Joe One”—an

atomic bomb essentially made in U.S.A., but assembled in, say, Stalinsk by Stalinists—which convinced you that now the U.S.A. must not make a hydrogen bomb.

You had a lot to answer for in the Communist apparatus so firmly installed at Los Alamos before 1946. One of the known agents of that apparatus — David Greenglass — last April gave the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee a somewhat more detailed account of an incident which he had related five years earlier during the trial of his sister Ethel and her husband:

GREENGLASS: Julius Rosenberg had instructed me to find people who were sympathetic to Communism in this project, and after finding them, he said, “Don’t mention them. Just write them down.” . . .

ROBERT MORRIS [Chief Counsel for the Committee]: Now, how many recruits had you written down? How many names had you written down, to the best of your recollection?

GREENGLASS: Oh, I would say there were between 20 and 25. . . .

MORRIS: Now, did this list of 20 to 25—did that exhaust, do you think, the reservoir of potential scientists who would turn over, who would work for Rosenberg?

GREENGLASS: Let me—I will answer that. I frankly say “No.” These people, these 20 or 25, were in my ken . . . there were others who were just as sympathetic who weren’t in Los Alamos, that I heard of but I couldn’t check of my own accord, and which I didn’t put down, you see.<sup>59</sup>

Your own ken, Doctor Oppenheimer, is—to put it mildly—considerably broader than that of David Greenglass. On the other hand, your ability to assess the political inclinations of atomic scientists is probably much more accurate, too. Since you know so many more scientists, but would probably screen them more finely than Greenglass could, perhaps you too would come out with a list of twenty to twenty-five. The detail is speculation.

Later, your judgment of Communism hardened. Not only were you to speak of “the obvious war between Russia and the United States,” but speaking of Communism itself you would say, you did say to the Gray Board, “Today it is a very simple thing. . . . We have a well-defined enemy.”<sup>60</sup>

Yet as late as June 1949 you still felt that there was some inherent in-

decency in a national military security program. You told the Joint Congressional Committee, when they asked your advice about the foreign distribution of isotopes, that that was “one of the few areas in which we are free to act the way we would like to act, generously, imaginatively and decently; in the things that involve security we are inhibited from doing that.”<sup>61</sup>

You said,

*I do not think anybody can be happy at the fine-tooth combing that has to be given to every man that has to work on the atomic energy program. But one understands why it is; and as long as it is restricted to those places where there are some secrets to be kept, people will stand for it.*

*I think the [Atomic Energy] Commission has balanced very carefully, in the few cases I know about, the requirements of security and the requirements of progress and humanity. It has not been easy.*<sup>62</sup>

Not easy for you, either, was it? Once you said:

*Though we are men of science and we have a loyalty to each other everywhere, we also have a loyalty to our homes and our countries against which we will not work.*<sup>63</sup>

The paradox was that from where you sat the very thing which to Teller and Lawrence and Strauss, and later Truman, looked like the logical move for home and country was the thing which seemed to be most enormously against home and country. For that hellish thing you would not work. But you could not tell them why.

### III. EXHORTATION

Seems pretty melodramatic, doesn’t it? How does it feel now to lecture at Harvard? How does it feel to preside at the Institute? Does it seem that the decorum there is what is real—that that is Veritas—and that Steve Nelson is a comic-strip character whom we can safely leave for Daddy Warbucks to handle?

But that won’t do, will it? Steve occupies the attention of the Supreme Court, he is real.

And Bernard Peters is real. It has been a long time since he was telling the Executive Board of the Communist-front Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians, in Berkeley (on April 14, 1943) “that it is absolutely necessary

to get a good foothold on the hill."<sup>64</sup> Now Dr. Peters is in Tata Institute in Bombay, working for Homi Bhabha—the atomic spirit of Geneva?<sup>65</sup>

Joan Hinton—the girl scientist from Los Alamos who has gone over to the Chinese Communists—is real. As a matter of fact she would fit right in at Cambridge, wouldn't she? I don't know her, but doesn't she have a New England background and good egghead connections (Lattimore, yourself) and a lot of that unobtrusive kind of suddenly disturbing feminine intelligence? The Lord knows where she is—somewhere in Suiyuan province of Inner Mongolia, working with Pontecorvo, no doubt.<sup>66</sup>

Reprints of "An Open Letter to Dr. Oppenheimer" (12 pages) are available at 25¢ each, 100 for \$20.00. Address

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These people, and so many more that I can't ask you about because I haven't the slightest idea who they are—or else no documentation so far—have not ceased to exist and to operate just because you are campused.

Doctor, why don't you come clean? It might be a novel experience for you. It might do you good. I think the amount of truth that came out in the 1954 hearings before the Gray Board did you a lot of good. In 1953 you said to the Graduate Alumni at Princeton this tortured kind of thing: "It is true that many particulars can be understood and subsumed by a general order. But it is probably no less a great truth that *elements of abstractly irreconcilable general orders can be subsumed by a particular.*"<sup>67</sup> Now that is pretty high-level stuff and I don't necessarily know what you meant by it, but one thing those words might mean is that a *double life is O.K.* Right?

Almost two years later, chastened (I think) by the loss of your Q clearance and all that was involved in that loss, you said over CBS radio, "Never before have we had to under-

stand the complementary, *mutually not compatible ways of life* and recognize *choice between them as the only course of freedom.*"<sup>68</sup> This language is still rarefied—much more so in context, by the way—but surely part of its meaning is, *sometimes you have to stand up and be counted.*

### Turn on the Lights

Man, this is it. This is one of those times.

Nobody who knows anything about your case, Doctor—nobody I know—doubts that if you really did break and tell all you know, the whole picture of the national defense and security of the United States would light up like a used-car lot.

If you are patriotic and humanitarian, why don't you turn on the lights? We might not like what we saw, but we sure would be better off seeing it than stumbling on it in the dark.

Maybe I'm wasting my time. Maybe I've got you wrong. Maybe Borden was right.

Well, but even if you are a Soviet agent, you could defect. They do it all the time. The damned Communist empire is going to hell in a basket, fast. You can see that. A guy that knows as much as you do still has time to switch. You could probably make a deal.

Not with me. I don't know a thing. I'm suggesting it to you. And to those on our side that have something to deal with. I'll bet you could get a call through to J. Edgar Hoover at almost any hour of the day or night. Very few people could, but I'll bet you could.

All right, think of it this way. You are an idealist, and you are a realist. I'm using both those words in the non-technical sense. You know the condition of man, and you know (for you have said it in your book) that we need to love one another. You want peace. You want to avert the destruction of cities.

Now the United States is a funny country. It is rich and fat and scant o' breath, not to mention naive and semilliterate. I think you know this country pretty well. You've been in New Mexico and Tennessee as well as California and New York. If you will think about it you will know that what we may call Jacksonianism is

not dead by a long shot. Ask Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., what he thinks about that, though of course his opinion is probably not as good as your own.

Here's the thing—Old Hickory was a killer, an arrant nationalist killer. He left his imprint. You see, when he thought it was for Rachel or the United States he didn't think he was being selfish or immoral to shoot to kill, or order the troops to fire.

*Nemo me impune lacessit.* You know about the rattlesnake flag. And you must have noticed the American reaction to Bulganin's boast about rockets against Britain.

On the other hand, if the U.S. can be sure that it has a monopoly or an unrivaled superiority in atomic and hydrogen weapons, then it will probably be in no hurry to use them. We used them against Japan, but that was a sequel to Pearl Harbor. There doesn't have to be another Pearl Harbor, does there? Then perhaps there will not be another Hiroshima.

Speaking of Hiroshima—if you do decide to talk, you had better open your mouth sort of wide and make it real plain. I read in the *New York Times* where you told a graduating class last June that "*the nation's leaders 'lost a certain sense of restraint' when they decided to drop the atomic bomb at Hiroshima.*"<sup>69</sup> This is an unfortunate way for a guy to get himself reported who not only "made the bomb," but also helped select the target.

You will remember that before the Gray Board you swore a solemn oath, and subsequently you said, among other things:

Hiroshima was, of course, very successful, partly for reasons unanticipated by us. We had been over the targets with a committee that was sent out to consult us and to consider them, and *the targets that were bombed [Hiroshima and Nagasaki] were among the list that seemed right to us. . . .* We did say that we did not think exploding one of these things as a firecracker over a desert was likely to be very impressive.<sup>70</sup>

We need your testimony, Doctor. Let's have an operation candor and end the torment of secrecy. In spite of my probing into your personal affairs and speculating about your individual psychology, I am not anxious to regulate your life. My concern is with U.S. military security. I think that all invasions of your privacy



ought to cease just as soon as you quit keeping private, matters of public consequence.

You can help your country. You can end the arms race by cutting off the "imitative" Soviets' source of supply of new information and materials. You can save from their own fanaticism those of your acquaintances who are working compulsively

to undermine and sabotage the land that feeds them and the friends who guard them. They will not all hate you for it, for among them are some who want to be caught, being somewhat like the young fellow in Chicago who scribbled on the wall (in lipstick, wasn't it? It was pretty unpleasant), "Catch me, please, before I kill again."

Once you said, "We are gradually coming to a critical awareness of the fact that it is much harder to tell the truth than we like to think."<sup>71</sup>

Let's try again. It gets easier.

When you have done that you may find a new though ancient complementarity, where "Mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other."

## Documentary Notes

1. See United States Atomic Energy Commission: *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board, Washington, D.C., April 12, 1954, through May 6, 1954*, p. 710. U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1954. Hereinafter this work is cited as *JRO Hearing*.

2. *Idem*, p. 837.

3. *Idem*, p. 184.

4. Wendell Latimer, Associate Director of the Radiation Laboratory, sometime Dean of Chemistry of the University of California, and possibly the saltiest witness in the Oppenheimer Hearings, under cross-examination by one of Dr. Oppenheimer's attorneys, was somewhat scornful in his rejection of the suggestion that Oppenheimer, to whom Latimer attributed tremendous personal influence, was himself under the influence of General Leslie R. Groves, Commanding General of the Manhattan Project, responsible for production of the atomic bomb. "Oppenheimer was the leader in science," said Latimer. "Groves was simply an administrator." *JRO Hearing*, p. 663 et seq.

5. According to Lincoln Barnett, "J. Robert Oppenheimer," *Life*, Oct. 10, 1949, p. 133, "... when the great ball of fire rolled upward to the blinded stars [in the original atomic bomb test in New Mexico, July 16, 1945] fragments of the *Bhagavad-Gita* flashed into [Dr. Oppenheimer's] mind: 'If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be like the splendor of the Mighty One. . . . I am become death, the shatterer of worlds.'"

6. *JRO Hearing*, pp. 116-117. Italics added, as in any other passages herein-after quoted from these hearings and italicized.

7. *Fear, War, and the Bomb*, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948, p. 5.

8. In *Atomic Power and Private Enterprise*, Joint Committee Print, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 82d Congress, 2d Session, Govt. Printing Office, 1952, p. 188.

9. *JRO Hearing*, p. 204.

10. *Idem*, p. 205.

11. *Ibid*.

12. *Idem*, p. 195.

13. *Idem*, p. 205.

14. Perhaps the most embarrassing of a number of characterizations of this sort is in Charles P. Curtis' *The Oppenheimer*

*Case*, Simon and Schuster, 1955, p. 276, where Curtis compares Dr. Oppenheimer to Joan of Arc. Two of the three members of the Gray Board, and four of the five members of the Atomic Energy Commission, Curtis compares to Joan's judges—"as honest a lot of poor fools as ever burned their betters."

15. *JRO Hearing*, p. 196.

16. *Idem*, p. 357.

17. *Idem*, p. 888.

18. *Idem*, p. 785.

19. *Ibid*.

20. *Ibid*.

21. *Idem*, p. 80.

22. *Idem*, p. 87.

23. *Idem*, pp. 249-250.

24. *Idem*, p. 250.

25. *Foreign Affairs*, July 1953, p. 529. Also in J. Robert Oppenheimer, *The Open Mind*, Simon and Schuster, 1955, p. 68.

26. *Foreign Affairs*, July 1953, pp. 526-527. *The Open Mind*, p. 64.

27. *Foreign Affairs*, July 1953, p. 528. *The Open Mind*, p. 66.

28. *JRO Hearing*, p. 75.

29. *Foreign Affairs*, July 1953, p. 526. *The Open Mind*, p. 64.

30. *JRO Hearing*, p. 664.

31. *Idem*, pp. 75-76.

32. *Foreign Affairs*, July 1953, p. 527. *The Open Mind*, p. 64.

33. To an INS reporter. One place to find it is *Newsweek*, Feb. 9, 1953.

34. *Foreign Affairs*, July 1953, p. 531. *The Open Mind*, p. 70.

35. *JRO Hearing*, p. 409.

36. *Idem*, p. 258.

37. *Idem*, p. 185.

38. *Idem*, pp. 101-102.

39. *Idem*, p. 28.

40. Dr. Robert F. Bacher was Dr. Oppenheimer's wartime colleague at Los Alamos, later a member of the original Atomic Energy Commission.

41. *Investigation into the United States Atomic Energy Project, Hearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy*, Govt. Printing Office, 1949, p. 770.

42. *Soviet Atomic Espionage*, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Govt. Printing Office, 1951, p. 193.

43. My information is based on a telephone conversation with the U.S. Treasury Department office in Oklahoma City.

44. *Investigation into the United States Atomic Energy Project, etc.*, p. 823.

45. *Idem*, p. 824.

46. *Idem*, p. 389.

47. *Uranium Inventory at Oak Ridge, Hearing before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy*, Govt. Printing Office, 1949, pp. 14-15.

48. *Ibid*.

49. *Foreign Affairs*, July 1953, p. 534. *The Open Mind*, p. 76.

50. *Investigation into the United States Atomic Energy Project, etc. Hearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy*, p. 310.

51. *Ibid*. See also Rep. (now Senator) Henry Jackson's almost identical question and Oppenheimer's almost identical answer, p. 302.

52. *JRO Hearing*, p. 233.

53. *Idem*, p. 647.

54. "The New Technique of Private War," in D. Masters & K. Way, *One World or None*, Whittlesey House, 1946, p. 41.

55. *JRO Hearing*, p. 242.

56. *Loc.cit*.

57. *JRO Hearing*, p. 714.

58. *Idem*, pp. 785, 805.

59. *Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, etc.* April 27, 1956. Part 21, pp. 1100-1101.

60. *JRO Hearing*, pp. 112, 252.

61. *AEC Investigation Hearing*, p. 299.

62. *Idem*, p. 302.

63. J. Robert Oppenheimer. "The Scientific Foundations of World Order," 2nd of 7 lectures (by various speakers) before the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver, 1946-7, published in Philip P. Wiener, *Readings in Philosophy of Science*, Scribner's, 1953, p. 432.

64. See *Facts Forum News*, June 1955, pp. 28-29. "The hill" means here the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. In AEC circles in New Mexico it means Los Alamos. And of course in Washington it means Capitol Hill.

65. *JRO Hearing*, p. 215.

66. See *Facts Forum News*, March 1955, p. 36ff.

67. *The Open Mind*, p. 124. Italics added.

68. *Idem*, p. 144. Italics added.

69. *New York Times*, June 10, 1956, p. 47. Italics added.

70. *JRO Hearing*, pp. 33-34. Italics added.

71. Lincoln Barnett, "J. Robert Oppenheimer," *Life*, Oct. 10, 1949, p. 136.



# from WASHINGTON straight

A NEWSLETTER

SAM M. JONES

## Labor Trouble

Poker-faced, drawling John L. McClellan, Arkansas Democrat and Chairman of the Select Committee, banged his gavel at 10:03 A.M., February 26, to state that his Select Committee would "conduct an investigation and study of the extent to which criminal or other improper practices or activities are, or have been, engaged in, in the field of labor-management relations." After stressing that the Committee would look at corruption in the field of management too, McClellan wearily described the Committee's job as "stupendous."

Lead-off witnesses were Wallace Turner and William Turner, reporters for the *Portland Oregonian*. The pair told a story which, if borne out by later testimony and documentary evidence, will brand Teamsters Union Chieftain Dave Beck as a man who cares not whether he gets a dollar from legitimate union activity or from the pockets of prostitutes.

Their testimony dealt with corrupt city, county and state officials who seemingly took orders from Beck or his henchmen. Most of the testimony, they said, will be confirmed via tape recordings now in possession of the Committee.

Third witness was a confused, amnesiac secretary-treasurer of a Seattle (Washington) Teamsters local. Overnight he had suffered a loss of memory and was unable to recall statements made to the counsel just the evening before. His story was one of thousands of dollars of local funds loaned without security other than a signature, or "copy," of a deed. The reluctant witness paid homage to the power of Beck when he grudgingly admitted his appearance and testimony before the Committee might cost him his job "any day, with resultant loss of retirement privileges" built up since World War I.

Senators Ives and McNamara had difficulty in finding or posing questions which might elicit something favorable to the Teamsters Union. In

fact, both stopped asking questions early in the session.

The future of some of the labor bosses may include unaccustomed hardships and constraints. Experts have been investigating them for many months. Now the Committee is displaying determination to expose scandals and, where necessary, to institute criminal proceedings.

## Pres. vs. Cong. Round Three

Not since the Truman Administration has the sinister word "impeachment" been a familiar term in the *Congressional Record*. But last week, Senator Jenner, excoriating the "Eisenhower Doctrine," said: "Any attempt by any official in the executive branch to carry out such a doctrine and to amalgamate the Army, Navy, or Air Force with the military forces of other areas under a super-national agency is a matter for impeachment."

Consider another "incident" of the past week for the illumination it conveys. Mr. David K. E. Bruce, nominated by Mr. Eisenhower as his Ambassador to West Germany, served as Ambassador to France in the Truman Administration. In the 1956 campaign he contributed to the Democratic Party. This was just a little too much even for Senator George Aiken, Administration wheel-horse and (up to now) one of the few strong men in the Senate who has been wholeheartedly an Eisenhower Republican. Anent the Bruce nomination, Senator Aiken said: "That eliminates any ardor we Senate Republicans might otherwise have to defend the Administration. . . . They ask us to defend Secretary John Foster Dulles and the President when they are criticized by the Democrats. But every time there is an important job to be filled, they give it to a Democrat." Senator Aiken is, among other things, an influential member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Eisenhower is going to miss him.

Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson's

disdainful attitude toward White House demands is sufficient comment on bipartisan cooperation. Minority Leader Knowland's frank dissatisfaction with the conduct of foreign policy just about completes the picture.

## Suffrage Pains

Residents of the District of Columbia have ancient complaints, as familiar as the Washington Monument and of the same vintage. No franchise. No home rule. Government by Congress rather than the people's choice. Taxation without representation, etc., etc. This year there is a chance that home rule may become a fact. And many of the hardy proponents have suddenly become as quiet as a Christmas mouse.

District Commissioners McLaughlin and Karrick are seeking Eisenhower's support: if the President actively advocates the proposal, there is a chance of congressional approval; and the record shows Eisenhower is on the side of the angels of home rule.

But the legislation will have to go through the House District Committee which has hitherto been the burying-ground of all such proposals. Bills pending and previously approved by the Senate specify an elected mayor, city council, school board, and a non-voting delegate to the House. By every biological and political determinant, it is a lead-pipe cinch that the "electorate" of the District of Columbia will be predominantly Negro within a few years. Negroes would now hold the balance of power. The prospect of a Negro mayor and council has chilled the ardor of a substantial number of leading citizens who have for years been in the vanguard of the "home-rulers." Overtly or covertly, they have sent their pleas to "Johnny" McMillan to save them from the suffrage. The Honorable John L. McMillan of South Carolina is an astute politician, a skilled parliamentarian and a man who stands by his guns. He is also Chairman of the House District Committee.



# *Dissent on Egypt*

FREDA UTLEY

*From time to time, conservatives disagree among themselves on matters of substantial importance—usually matters of strategy, or interpretation, or method. With this issue we inaugurate a department that we will publish irregularly, called "The Open Question." It will, from time to time, introduce the dissents of relevant members of the conservative community. Today we turn over the column to Miss Freda Utley, who, as the reader will see, passionately disagrees with the handling of the Mideast crisis by NATIONAL REVIEW. Miss Utley:*

Returning home at the end of December after a seven months study tour of the Far East, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, I was dismayed to find that NATIONAL REVIEW had not supported Eisenhower's wise and politically courageous stand on Suez, which has so greatly enhanced American prestige, influence and power almost everywhere in the world.

Instead of studying and calmly appraising the evidence in the case of Egypt v. the Suez Canal Company, you have taken an *ex parte* stand and engaged in vituperation instead of argument. In your November 17 issue, Nasser is accused of "a ravenous ambition and unbounded unscrupulousness," of "strutting lawlessness," and of leading "primitive Arab nationalism." Permit me to give your readers a few of the indisputable facts ignored by NATIONAL REVIEW and generally unknown to Americans.

First, Nasser did not break any treaty nor contravene international law when his government took possession of the Suez Canal and started to operate it. What he actually did was to "nationalize" an Egyptian company, incorporated under Egyptian law, which had a concession to operate a canal running through Egyptian territory which had been built by Egyptian labor. Far from having "expropriated" the shareholders, he offered them full compensation at the price of their shares on the Paris Bourse on the day preceding the nationalization decree.

Paragraph sixteen of the 1866 agreement between the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company reads: "The Suez Canal

Company is an Egyptian Company subject to Egyptian laws and customs."

In 1939, in a memorandum submitted to the Mixed Courts in Egypt which pronounced judgment in its favor in February 1940, the British Government maintained that:

The Suez Canal Company is a legal person in accordance with Egyptian law. Its nationality and character are solely Egyptian. It is, therefore, subject to Egyptian laws.

The British memorandum further stated:

It is true that the Company is given the name of "The Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal." . . . this designation cannot deprive the Company of its Egyptian nationality. *The Company is Egyptian in accordance with the established general principles of law and in particular with the principles of private international laws and the Company's organic law. [Italics added.]*

Lastly, it should be noted that Article 8 of the agreement concluded between Egypt and Britain in 1954 states specifically that the Suez Canal is an integral part of Egypt.

If the British Government had not argued in 1939-40 that the Suez Canal Company is Egyptian, it would have been contravening international law by denying passage to Italian and German ships during the war. If Egypt, under British control, had the right to block passage to enemy ships during both world wars, one cannot deny Egypt's right to bar Israeli ships, since there is only an armistice between her and the State of Israel.

And, since Egypt, after nationalizing the canal, managed to keep it operat-

ing and allowed free passage to the ships of all nations except Israel, Nasser cannot be accused of having contravened the 1888 Constantinople Convention.

NATIONAL REVIEW's attempt to "subtract the role—indeed, the very existence—of Israel from the Suez question" is like staging a performance of Hamlet, not in the classic phrase without the Prince of Denmark, but without the background of the murder of his father.

The UN's Partition Plan had stipulated that the Arabs should retain their property and civil rights in the part of their country delivered over to Israeli rule. But Israel dispossessed most of them, and drove a million out of their homes and ancestral lands in the 60 per cent of Palestine allotted to it, as well as from the half of Jerusalem that it took under its control. This action, which created the problem of the 900,000 destitute Arab refugees, was accomplished by means of such terroristic measures as the massacre of the entire male population of Dier Yasin.

In contrast, Nasser, now called an Arab Hitler by some American newspapers, as well as by the British "gutter press," displayed exemplary moderation in his treatment of the Jews following the Israeli-Anglo-French attacks on Egypt. Instead of following the precedent set by America in the treatment of our Japanese citizens following Pearl Harbor (which, as Congressman Dr. Walter Judd said in a speech on December 7, 1956, had now been copied by our Anglo-French allies at Port Said), the Egyptian Government left its many Jewish citizens unmolested, and expelled only enemy nationals.

### *Arms from Czechoslovakia*

Similarly, with regard to the accusation that Nasser is an ally of the Communists or their "puppet" because he bought Czech arms last year, why has no such accusation ever been levelled at Israel, which, in 1948, when it defeated the Egyptian Army and the poorly armed Palestinian Arabs who vainly endeavored to defend their lands and property, was largely indebted for its victory to "timely and substantial shipments of arms from behind the Iron Curtain, primarily from Czechoslovakia"?

A judgment against the State of Israel, which falsely pretends to speak for all Jews, has been pronounced by Rabbi Elmer Berger in his book, *Who Knows Better Should Say So*; by Alfred Lilienthal in *What Price Israel*; and by other courageous American Jews and Gentiles alike who realize that Israeli pretensions, ambitions, and practices must eventually rebound to the discredit and hurt of Jews everywhere in the world.

In the hour interview I had with Colonel Nasser on December 19 in his retreat near Cairo, he said to me:

"We do not want to see Egyptians dispossessed of their lands and property and become refugees like the Arabs of Palestine. This is the prospect we faced last month. We knew we were too weak to resist Britain's attack, but we had confidence in Western moral force to defeat British power politics. For the first time, we were able to put our case to the world and consequently, Western morality defeated aggression."

President Nasser denied that there was any Russo-Egyptian agreement or alliance. He had bought Czech arms and equipment after the West denied them because Israel was receiving large quantities, especially from France. "Our fear of Israel," he said, "is comparable on a smaller scale to America's fear of the Atom Bomb."

The favorite quotation of the sophisticated Arabs of both the Christian and Moslem faiths whom I met in Cairo and Port Said, Beirut, Jerusalem and Bethlehem, was Winston Churchill's wartime statement that he would "take the aid of the devil himself" to save England. Why, they asked, should Nasser be called a Communist agent or puppet because he bought arms from Russia, whereas Churchill at Teheran and Yalta agreed to deliver millions to Communist slavery in order to "win the war" against Nazi Germany?

I became convinced, during my interview with President Nasser, that he is not an extremist who dreams of "driving Israel into the sea." He indicated that he would make peace but only on the condition that Arab rights and "national dignity" be respected and that Israel be compelled to make restitution to the refugees, abandon its expansionist aims, and obey the UN's resolutions concerning

its borders. Unfortunately, however, just as Israeli leaders make extremist statements, such as "expanding from the Nile to the Euphrates," so, too, Nasser is inclined to make fiery speeches in the fashion of a cheerleader, shouting to his football team, "Rip 'em and tear 'em up!"

In the Middle East climate of fear, suspicion, hatred and exacerbated nationalism engendered by the tragic cycle of injustice, violence, retaliation and counter-retaliation, it is now practically impossible for the leaders on either side to pursue a policy of moderation leading toward reconciliation and peace. In order to retain the support and leadership of their peoples, they are compelled at the very least to make belligerent speeches. Yet the situation is not hopeless. President Eisenhower, having won the confidence of the Arab world by his courageous and principled stand against the Israeli-Franco-British attack on Egypt, could now enforce a just and enduring peace between Israel and the Arab world involving concessions by both sides. If Eisenhower is of the stuff of which great American Presidents are made, he will continue to ignore Anglo-French and Zionist pressures and save the Middle East from Communist conquest by default, by his adherence to fundamental American principles.

By some strange logic which can be understood only by acceptance of the premise that two wrongs make a right, Henry Hazlitt, in your February 9 issue, argues that Israel should not be compelled to obey the UN by evacuating the Egyptian territory it occupied by armed force unless there is also "an immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Hungary and from every other satellite nation where they are not wanted." How can the Arabs be expected to see any justice in the argument that they should, again and again, be called upon to pay the penalty for the crimes, follies or fears of the Western Powers? In 1947 when Truman and Stalin jointly pressured the UN to establish the State of Israel by partitioning Palestine, the argument which won approval for this act of injustice against the Arab population was the need to make restitution to the Jews for their abominable treatment by Nazi Germany. Today, the Arabs are in effect being told, even by such

good men as Senators Knowland and Bridges, that because the West dared not risk war with the Soviet Empire by supporting the Hungarian fighters for freedom, the Arabs must be penalized, lest it be said that Israel was punished for her aggression while Soviet Russia goes unscathed.

### *Comparison with China*


History never repeats itself so exactly that its lesson is clear for all to read. Yet, there is a close and tragic similarity between the situation in the Arab Middle East today and that of the Chinese Far East a generation ago. In 1922 Sun Yat-sen turned to Moscow for help in the liberation of China after the Western powers had refused to relinquish the imperialist privileges, rights and powers which kept China impotent, divided, economically backward, and poverty-stricken. By so doing, he unwittingly opened the door to Communist infiltration, subversion, and armed attack which, a quarter of a century later, delivered China over to Communist tyranny and converted her into Moscow's most reliable and subservient satellite.

Anyone well acquainted with the tragic drama of Modern China realizes that we could have prevented the Communist conquest if we had given real backing to Chiang Kai-shek and the forces of moderate, Western orientated nationalism he represented. Yet, there is a similar obtuseness with regard to the Arab world where it is not yet too late.

The great danger which confronts us, and of which there is reason to hope that President Eisenhower is aware, is that by treating Nasser as if he were a Communist agent or ally, which he is not, we shall force him to become one, or alternatively, destroy him and make way for a Communist dictator.

Vice President Nixon has truly stated that "history will give eternal credit to our President and Secretary of State for choosing the hard road of principle." If President Eisenhower were to revert under pressure to the support of Britain, France and Israel, right or wrong, NATIONAL REVIEW, together with most of the American press, must take its share of the blame for pushing the Middle East into Moscow's welcoming arms.





# The THIRD WORLD WAR

JAMES BURNHAM

## Definitions and Distinctions

Because the words used in the analysis of politics, strategy and international affairs are not very precise, communication in these fields is difficult. I want to indicate how I understand certain of the terms that have been under recent discussion in NATIONAL REVIEW.

*Neutral and Neutralist.* Switzerland is "neutral"; India is "neutralist." There is a world of difference.

"Neutral" is a narrowly military (or physical) term. A nation is "neutral" when in an international conflict it refrains from overt military (or related) acts favoring one or the other contestant.

In this sense Switzerland has been neutral since the Napoleonic wars, and intends to remain so—is prepared, indeed, to fight to remain so. This does not imply that Switzerland is indifferent to the outcome of the present struggle between Communism and the West. Switzerland is integrally a part of the West.

"Neutralism" is a social, moral and philosophical rather than military concept. From the neutralist standpoint, there is nothing to choose between the values of the Communist world and those of its active opponents, between the Soviet Union and the United States. A neutralist nation may aim to prevent either from winning a clear-cut victory, may wish to see both destroyed, or may figure that its interests are best served by teaming up on one of the sides. Thus neutralism may or may not be neutral.

Now the Central-East Europe policy that I have been advocating proposes that Central and Eastern Europe should become not "neutralist," but—for a period—"neutral." The policy is predicated on the fact that, with the possible exception of Bulgaria, these nations, as distinguished from the governments that may happen to have been imposed on some of them, are not at all neutralist but Western.

*Tito and Titoism.* Historical experience has shown that "Titoism" is not a "universal," not a political form that might be exemplified in the government of this or that nation, but merely the government that actually did develop in the specific circumstances of the specific nation of Yugoslavia. That is to say, there is no such thing as "Titoism." There is only the present Yugoslav government headed by a man named Tito.

The uniqueness of Tito was quickly shown not only by the failure of all other satellite governments to match or even attempt his kind of break with Moscow, but by the fact that Tito never won any following in any Communist party in the free world. Moreover, Tito never succeeded in formulating a doctrine that could give "Titoism" an ideological footing.

Tito had no admirers in Hungary. His example played no role in last year's Hungarian revolt. The program of the Hungarian revolutionaries, much of which Imre Nagy came to accept even while still calling himself a Communist, had nothing in common with the program of Tito's government in Yugoslavia. Nor are the past year's developments in Poland significantly "Titoist." Oddly enough, though there has been no open break between Warsaw and Moscow, and though Soviet troops are still garrisoned on Polish soil, Poland has in one year moved considerably further away from an orthodox Communist pattern of internal life than has Yugoslavia in eight years of Tito.

Discussions of strategy and foreign policy might be clarified by dropping the term "Titoism." It doesn't make much sense to be for Titoism (like Mr. Dulles) or against Titoism (like Mr. Schlamm), if Titoism just doesn't exist.

*Coexistence Moral and Strategic.* I have been puzzled that Messrs. Schlamm, Meyer and Bozell (most

explicitly Mr. Meyer), in their comments on national strategy toward Eastern Europe, suggest that "coexistence" is "immoral." There is danger here of jumbled categories.

For me (or you), as an individual, to "coexist with Communism" is immoral. Communism is evil, and as a moral being I ought to reject and actively oppose it. But it does not follow that it is wrong for a non-Communist nation to attempt to coexist with a Communist nation—that is, to try a pacific *modus operandi*. This is not a moral but a strategic and geopolitical problem. In fact, I would say that if morality enters in at all on this point, it is immoral for one nation not to try to coexist peacefully with every other—no matter what their regimes.

For the U.S. coexistence with the Soviet Union is incorrect as a policy not because it is immoral but because it is strategically impossible. The security and basic interests of the U.S. require us to try to block further Soviet advance, and to reduce Soviet power to a point from which it no longer constitutes an intolerable threat. That is all.

*The Eisenhower Axioms.* The basic "Eisenhower axiom" is that the United States will not deliberately initiate the risk of all-out nuclear war. (As Mr. Buckley points out, the United States would of course accept the risk, and if necessary fight all-out, under certain conditions—obvious self-defense, what it would regard as major "aggression," or in pursuance of formal treaty obligations.) This axiom is now probably accepted by the leadership of all nations, at least until and unless one of them makes a decisive armament breakthrough. Therefore a policy proposal that contradicts this axiom is merely Platonic, and not serious in a strategic sense.

Naturally this does not mean that one must come to the same conclusions as Mr. Eisenhower does about foreign policy. Nor does it prevent one from criticizing this or other of his axioms while at the same time favoring a specific practical move as the best possible within their logical framework. The refusal to make distinctions concerning the actual world because it fails to conform to the Ideal is an offshoot of the seductive and perennial Manichean heresy.

# The Liberal Line...

WILLMOORE KENDALL

## On Second Thought

The major purpose of propaganda, someone has written, is to convince the producer not the consumer, the propagandizer not the propagandized.

The statement, like most statements intended to amuse the writer not the reader, oversimplifies the point it makes. But the point remains a good one, namely: That the propagandist often finds himself defending a position clearly at variance with his principles, real or avowed. That at such a moment he has to persuade himself of the justice of his new position. And that the critic of propaganda who ignores this aspect of the matter does so at his peril.

Especially the critic of Liberal political propaganda. For the Liberal propaganda machine has no principles except that which looks to the relief or prevention of "suffering" on the part of such persons or groups as it, at the moment, happens to "identify" with. Its "principles," therefore, are always avowed not real. And its false picture of reality is forever letting it in for surprises: situations that it has not foreseen; situations in which the positions it adopted yesterday in its typical all-out fashion are clearly inapplicable; situations in which it has got to convince itself that yesterday's principle must, as a matter of self-evident principle, go out of the window.

A case in point—an obvious one because public opinion is clearly way out in front of the machine on the issue at stake, and needs no persuading—is the machine's failure to support Eisenhower on sanctions against Israel. For the matter about which the machine has left no room for doubt in recent months is its own commitment to the UN Assembly as the "conscience of mankind," to the rulings of that conscience as a higher law to which all (friends and enemies alike, remember?) must subordinate themselves, and to the "principle" that anyone who defies that con-

science must, forthwith, have it taken out of his hide. And it is appalled at the position it finds itself adopting, now that taking it out of somebody's hide is actually at issue, and that somebody turns out to be Israel. So its search for considerations with which to justify and explain that position to itself has, in the last days, become a major production.

As witness the kind of considerations—of interest not because they are wrong (which this columnist thinks they are not), but because the machine had cut itself off from the possibility of using them, or letting others use them—that abound in the current "News of the Week in Review" of the *New York Times*.

Item: The big question, reports James Reston, is *not* should Israel withdraw, which of course she should, but how explain the "outspoken criticism" against Eisenhower's putting economic pressure on Israel to rely on his promises? Well, it just so happens that "responsible men" in Washington ("in private but seldom . . . in public") have some light to throw on the matter. They do not—Heaven forbid!—"justify the mulish determination of Ben-Gurion to overplay his hand"; but a) there is now a "crisis of confidence in US leadership of the world"; b) "United States verbal promises" and "UN resolutions" are "no longer as valuable as they once were on the international market," and c) the President's recent "solemn speech" did not help matters: The speech implies that failure to use sanctions against Russia in Hungary does not warrant refusal to use them against Israel, thus repudiating the axiom that there cannot be "one law for the weak . . . another for the strong." And, "more important," it emphasized—*mirabile dictu*—Eisenhower's determination to "rely on the UN in dealing with Egypt," and "ruled out the use of force." Which

brings Mr. Reston to his capital discovery: Responsible men (not Mr. Reston) are saying that "other governments" (not the responsible men, not Mr. Reston) are "more and more convinced that the UN, as presently constituted, is no substitute for vigorous US diplomacy backed by the willingness to use force, if necessary, in support of just compromises."

Item: The Senate, writes William S. White from Washington, "is in an outcry of resistance against the apparent intention of the Administration to support or tolerate UN sanctions on Israel." This "state of affairs" clearly wants some explaining. It just so happens, however, that "the most ineluctable [reason] . . . is the simple, pragmatic fact that in harsh political terms at least the Administration has at last become vulnerable to general criticism in foreign affairs." Those who are least supporting Mr. Eisenhower's policy, moreover, are—hold your breath—the "internationalists" among the Republican senators plus the Democratic senators, who are in general "internationalists." The clear implication? Well, that the internationalist senators—that is, the good guys in the Senate—think the President's sanctions policy won't do.

Item: A cartoon contrasting November 1956 (Eisenhower and Congress cordially shaking hands) with February 1957 (Eisenhower and Congress Indian-wrestling, one supposes over Israel). A cartoon showing the UN, head covered with a top hat, saying to itself "I just don't quite know where I stand." A cartoon of Uncle Sam as a roc looking quizzically at the two eggs (Egypt, Israel) it has laid. A cartoon (Ben-Gurion among accusing fingers) with the caption: "The Way of the Transgressor is Hard," with "Transgressor" copy-edited to read "little Transgressor." A cartoon showing tiny Israel about Nothing"), the U.S. ("We Promise to Do All We Can Except Take Action"), Britain ("We Promise to Discuss . . . Nasser Willing"), Israel ("Promises! Promises! What About Guarantees?"). A cartoon showing tiny Israel about to dive from a high board into a soup-bowl that Dulles ("Don't Worry! Jump!") holds out to him.

No anti-Israel cartoons are in evidence. This was one week the *Times* knew what it wanted.



# THE IVORY TOWER

WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR.

## Here & There in the College World

At the **University of Pennsylvania**, the faculty adviser of the Government Club took the extraordinary step of speaking out against the Club's decision to invite Communist editor John Gates to debate on the question, "Does Communism Have a Future in the United States?" Dr. Henry Wells stated that he acted not out of fear that "the minds of our undergraduates will be corrupted by a single Communist speaker, however eminent or persuasive," but because he saw "no sufficient justification for thus helping to rehabilitate the Communist movement in this country." Rushing to the rescue of academic freedom, the Dean of Men announced that his office takes the view that "any speaker can be invited to speak on campus by any organization." Mr. Gates' appearance was hampered by the fact that he is currently out on bail—having recently been convicted of violating whatever law he most recently violated and got caught violating—and is restricted, under the terms of bail, from leaving Southern New York State. Upon request, the U.S. District Attorney waived this prohibition. He too, manifestly, understands academic freedom.

The undergraduate newspaper world is aghast at the effrontery of the administration of the **University of Washington** which has refused, just plain refused, to honor a fundamental student right. The University hired a football coach and neglected to divulge to the student paper the salary at which he was hired—on the grounds, as the University put it, that "a man's salary is his personal business." For this impudence the administration confronted a front-page editorial entitled "The Right to Know," observing that "information which is of vital interest and concern to the student body and the public, as we feel this is, should be made public . . . The student body and the public must be given the right to judge

for themselves" whether the football coach is being paid the right sum—just as they have come to judge whether a football coach is doing a good job.

On top of everything else, the **University of Florida** must now contend with litigious students. Professor John Harrison of the History Department gave Mrs. Ann Norton an E in Ancient History. That E festered, and Mrs. Norton finally revolted. Turning to the contemporary equivalent of flogging the schoolmaster, she has hired herself a lawyer, and is going after the University of Florida with a vengeance. The University, in self-defense, is contending that Mrs. Norton is a terrible student, that what she knows about Ancient History wouldn't fill a bluebook. The trial should be fascinating. Mrs. Norton is unquestionably cramming for it.

### The Oppressions of Adults

The editors of the *Daily Tar Heel* of the **University of North Carolina** are out of humor with the world they live in. They can't stand the conformity they see 'round about them, which they dissect as follows: The blame lies first on "boards of control who allow a university to emasculate itself, who demand that the university shy away from anything 'controversial.'" But, primarily, the blame lies with "The people of America, who do not demand that their institutions of higher learning again become market places of question, of doubt, of wonder, of freedom to indulge in partisan activity. . . . They are afraid to allow the institutions of higher learning the right to doubt [with the result that] something . . . basic, important is beginning to crumble. It is the people's, the students', the nation's right to question, to doubt, to wonder." And the paralyzing final observation, "Doubt, you will remem-

ber, is what built the United States of America."

Quiet, Scholar at Work Department. (From the *Michigan Daily Official Bulletin*, **University of Michigan**): "Doctoral Examination for Robert Thompson Bowen Jr., Thurs., Jan. 10, University Elementary School, at 1:00 p.m. Chairman, P. A. Hunsicker, Education; thesis: 'An Experimental Study of Golf Putting Using Beginning Golfers.'"

On Reaching the Heights of Mental Strength at the **University of North Carolina**, And the Dizzying Effects Thereof, Department (from letter to *The Tar Heel*). "The Christian religion of today is the acme of absurdity. The defenders of the Christian faith are its greatest enemies . . . These weak creatures shudder at the thought of mental strength . . . I am not meek, for I have mental strength. My religion is in my mind, and does not need the accessories of going to church and performing the babblings of materialistic rituals . . . The meek shall inherit the earth—six feet of it."

Department of Lucidity (from an editorial in the *University Hatchet*, **George Washington University**, bemoaning censorship of undergraduate newspapers). "In a story of a Sigma Delta Chi (professional journalism fraternity) seminar on undergraduate journalism, it is stated that the freedom of student editors runs from complete freedom to write what they please regardless of nominal control by publications boards, to operation as commercial enterprises with no official connections to their colleges, to the unfortunate cases where the freedom of the student editor has been suppressed temporarily or permanently, usually as a result of what college authorities deem to be misuse abuse of that freedom."

Can You Finish the Sentence? Department. Memo from Sarah Gibson Blanding to the Friends of Vassar. "At this time of each year when I write to the Friends of Vassar, I have high hopes that I shall be permitted the pleasure of telling you about aspects of Vassar life other than her financial problems. Each year . . ."

(Answer: " . . . these hopes turn out to be in vain.")

# ARTS and MANNERS

WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM

## *The Horrors of Comedy*

There is of course no doubt that our world is going to hell, but sometimes one wonders whether it does not deserve better. And then one sees a play like *The Tunnel of Love*, by Joseph Fields and Peter DeVries, and one can hardly wait for the day of reckoning.

Now *The Tunnel of Love* is just a little comedy, its authors had obviously nothing on their minds but easy money, and perhaps I shouldn't make so much fuss about an inconsequential Broadway caper, even if it is prurient. On the other hand, Mr. DeVries is a member of the *New Yorker* family, and I know better than to underrate the importance of that fact. In my way of assessing things, the *New Yorker* has easily as much power as England and Benelux combined, give or take a few Grand Duchies. I expect Mr. James Thurber to shrink Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's head any day now, and if Mr. E. B. White writes just a few more of these utterly, utterly delicious essays on World Government, our last few national geese are cooked. For, though it may be possible to withstand the power of the press, the world cannot possibly resist the power of the All-American Suburban Wife. And the *New Yorker* is her Allah as well as Allah's prophet. Between advertisements for *Arpège* and Maidenform, this Koran of conformity instructs almost 500,000 genteel ladies (not to mention thousands of housebroken gentlemen) every week on what's good for a well-groomed soul. Mr. Peter DeVries, for instance.

Now this Mr. DeVries has written a novel which I haven't read, but it didn't help me at all because Broadway (where they know darned well who's who in our cultural hierarchy) wouldn't slip up on a single hard-bound proclamation of the *New Yorker* dynasty, ever. So the novel was turned, by Mr. Joseph Fields, one of Broadway's oldest cutters & fitters, into *The Tunnel of Love: A New Comedy*. The comedy consists of letting

two actors and four actresses use on each other the kind of lewd language which, on my word of honor, travelling salesmen would never use on farmer's daughters—not so much because travelling salesmen have a greater sense of propriety than *New Yorker* regulars but simply because they have more taste.

The plot is about how some people just can't and can't have children, hard as they work at it, while others have them on the first tryst. I am in no condition to tell about the plot in greater detail because I was much too embarrassed for the actors, for the ladies in the audience, and for myself, to respond to whatever message Mr. DeVries had in his sophisticated mind.

It turned out, however, that I didn't need to be embarrassed for the ladies in the audience. They enjoyed every smutty remark and were, in general, a horror. The feminist cause, it seems, has won out for good once ladies can lap up in public a type of humor that, in my day, was scribbled on the walls of gents' rooms. I saw a gentleman squirm in his seat and fidget around his collar, simply because there seems in some of us to survive a modicum of breeding. The ladies—no! They're clearly the worldlier sex. We seem to be moving toward a new and nicely inverted Double Standard, under which you will watch your language when gentlemen are present.

*The Tunnel of Love*, I have no doubt, will be a hit, if only because I loathed the play. (If I were a Broadway producer, I would employ a man like me as a pre-taster and I would produce only plays he could not stomach.) Mr. Tom Ewell, who has put sex on the map in *The Seven Year Itch*, parlays again what seems to me a serious case of palsy into what our audiences consider an acting triumph. He shakes and trembles through the play as if, after several years of single-tracked stage activity, he were in dire need of Sex Anonymous. But so seems Broadway as a whole.

## *The Price of Prosperity*

There will be, I trust, consensus among the metropolitan critics that this was the worst season Broadway has ever staggered through; and after weeks of melancholy brooding I think I can offer an explanation. It may all be due to that soporific prosperity around us. When their wallets are even fuller than their bellies, people seem to sink into a placid stupor of stupidity. For instance, people are willing to spend twenty dollars per couple on an outing like *Holiday For Lovers: A New Romantic Comedy* by Ronald Alexander. If the National Gross Product were only a trifle below \$400 billion, this unfathomably inane play wouldn't have got by the first reader in any agent's office. But things are getting bigger and better every day in every way, and so, what the hell, even *Holiday For Lovers* is being produced, starring Mr. Don Ameche who once saw better days, in the movies, when he invented the telephone.

This time, he plays a kind of "Dagwood"—that comic strip epitome of American manhood, so dumb, so hearty, so loyal, so helpless, and above all, I repeat, so dumb. With his wife and younger daughter he embarks upon a trip to wicked Europe, partly to surprise his older daughter, who studies the piano and the facts of life in Paris, partly (little does he know!) to surprise himself. This play must be seen to be believed. It contains, I concede, an absolutely complete collection of all the jokes the nation's College Humor magazines have made on the subject of traveling abroad since their inception in the darkest nineteenth century.

There is something truly awesome in the entertainment demands of a nation that will accept even *Holiday For Lovers* as satisfactory supply. Still, just in case this play, too, proves to be a hit, I would at least worry about the spending habits of that nation. To waste twenty dollars on a package which, I swear, contains no more laughs than any one of the dreary humor magazines that sell everywhere for a dime is, I submit, inflationary behavior. A nation that apparently does not give a hoot about corrupting its soul should at least recoil from debauching its currency.



# To the Editor

## The Zhukov Plan

In line with the first editorial note in "The Week" [February 23] on President Ike and Marshal Zhukov, I'd like to suggest that, since the latter, as C-in-C of the Soviet Red Army, was primarily responsible for the systematic butcheries in Budapest, the President might no longer find it impolitic to remember something that Zhukov told him in Europe shortly after V-E Day. The genial Marshal explained the very simple device he employed to clear mine fields. Remember? He herded infantry into them to explode the mines, and incidentally blow great numbers of his uniformed *mouzhiks* sky-high in chunks, so that the more valuable tanks, guns and impedimenta could safely follow through.

With this under his hat, the President of the United States has, during the past couple of years, prior to the Hungarian incident, found it diplomatically expedient to pretend that this monster was his esteemed wartime comrade and friend. With all the hellishness of the Red suppression of the revolt in Hungary on the record, will President Ike again affront American public opinion by having further correspondence with his dear comrade Zhukov, in the interest of PEACE? He may. We know now that he is capable of it. God help us during the next four years, if he lasts that long.

Bernardsville, N.J.

HEPTISAX

## The Burnham Proposals

Congratulations on William F. Buckley, Jr.'s article [February 23] discussing the "Burnham proposals." I would sum up his views by saying that Mr. Burnham's proposals and the interesting comments thereon bring into sharp relief what to me is the most dangerous defect in our conduct of foreign affairs, both past and present. Namely, a failure to adopt the offensive . . . everywhere throughout the world, at each and every opportunity for the purpose of destroying the Soviet Russian regime. . . .

Once our government adopts the offensive strategy, the tactics to carry out the strategy can be infinitely varied. Indeed, efforts to shore up weak peoples both economically and militarily dangerously undesirable under our present defensive strategy might be just the thing in various parts of the world in conjunction with and intimately related to a dedicated offensive policy with respect to Soviet Russia and Co. . . .

FERDINAND LATHROP MAYER  
Bennington, Vt.

## Medical Ethics

Mr. Stetson's letter [on euthanasia, February 23] deserves an answer . . . to refute the trend toward materialistic, economic pragmatism. . . .

Aside from the theological use of an individual, what human being is to say when an individual has outlived his or her usefulness—to what, to whom? Family, state, society, or to the most important Being, God?

Until man has that infinite power of decision, euthanasia had best be left in the proper hands of God the Creator.

Cleveland, Ohio FELIX A. SPITTLER, M.D.

## Krutch and Kant

Warren L. Fleischauer's contrast of Joseph Wood Krutch's *The Modern Temper* (1929) and the same author's *The Measure of Man* (1953) in your February 16 issue was enjoyable to me, particularly because I had recently read *The Measure of Man*. . . . Krutch has apparently been much influenced by trends in Physics to see the reality of mind or consciousness and the error of ascribing determinism to the behavior of individuals within a group. From Physics he has been aided in realizing that "any man's destiny is to some extent in his own hands."

. . . To make consciousness supreme is the Kantian escape from determinism, and the history of German Idealism testifies how belief in man's spirit as supreme can produce immanentist delusions of grandeur.

Fleischauer could well have asked whether the humanist self-sufficiency of Krutch gives much assurance that true values can be found.

Krutch would probably not like Pascal's saying that the greatest use of reason is to discover the limits of reason.

Kent, Ohio

SHERMAN BARNES

## Conservative Meetings

I wish to compliment Revilo Oliver for his article on the Chicago meeting of the Abraham Lincoln Republican Club [NATIONAL REVIEW, February 23] and you for publishing such a frank "estimate of the meeting."

The last paragraph of the article clicks with me. I have attended many conservative meetings. . . . Holding them is well worth while, as they bring conservatives together for conference, renewal of friendships and "inspiration." But so far as having any particular political significance, these meetings amount to little if anything. . . . Our people are not trained or versed in political tactics and have no idea how to go about getting political organization at the grass roots level. I know, because I am one of them.

Wisconsin

NAME WITHHELD

## Righting the Balance

In the February 23 issue, "From Washington Straight" refers to the Defense Department's thirty-eight million dollar budget. Better correct to thirty-eight billion, before we lose our balance—in budgeting, of course.

New York City

ANSELM DE MARIA


## Presidents in Glass Houses

This part of California is up in arms against the Budget Bureau's proposed spending for 1958 . . . If further disintegration of the Republican Party is to be avoided, Republican members of Congress will have to make some pretty constructive efforts to bring about a return to financial sanity in bureaucratic Washington.

There is no question that the expenditure of vast nonproductive sums abroad contributes to more inflation. Before this Administration throws any more rocks at businessmen and labor leaders it had better take a more careful look at its own glass house on the Potomac.

Pasadena, Cal.

H. L. SPENCER



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